DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 425 491 EA 029 247

AUTHOR Dixon, Douglas A.
TITLE Conceptions of Democracy and School Reform: Can "Community" Democratic School Reforms Thrive in America's Liberal or Participatory Democratic Culture?
PUB DATE 1998-04-00
NOTE 72p.; Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Educational Research Association (San Diego, CA, April 13-17, 1998).
PUB TYPE Opinion Papers (120) -- Speeches/Meeting Papers (150)
EDRS PRICE MF01/PC03 Plus Postage.
DESCRIPTORS *Board of Education Policy; *Democracy; *Educational Change; Educational Philosophy; *Educational Policy; Elementary Secondary Education; Local Issues; Local Legislation; *Participative Decision Making; Philosophy; *School Community Relationship; School Districts

ABSTRACT

This paper reviews the literature and findings of a prior study (Dixon 1997) that described and categorized contrasting elements of different conceptions of democracy: liberal democracy, participatory democracy, and community democracy. A table in the appendix also presents this comparison. These contrasting conceptions of democracy were then used to evaluate recent reform ideas of three prominent democratic school reformers: Theodore Sizer, "Horace's Hoe"; Carl Glickman, "Revolutionizing America's Schools"; and Henry Levin, "The Accelerated Schools Resource Guide." Others sources are concerned with ideas such as greater democracy in school decision making; shared governance; parental consultation; local school political structures and constituencies; and the product and process of democratic reforms. These earlier writings provide an understanding of how experts describe American democracy, and develop implications for reformers who want to establish democratic school culture. Content analysis of the works by Sizer, Glickman, and Levin is used to categorize their views on the following issues: elements of community democratic education; views on government; nature of individuals and of the masses; mode of participation, nature of problems and knowledge, and information access and dissemination; expanse of government; value priorities; and implications for consumers of community democratic education reforms. (Contains 143 references.) (RIB)

****
* Reproductions supplied by EDRS are the best that can be made *
* from the original document. *
****

ED 425 491

CONCEPTIONS OF DEMOCRACY AND SCHOOL REFORM: CAN 'COMMUNITY' DEMOCRATIC SCHOOL REFORMS THRIVE IN AMERICA'S LIBERAL OR PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRATIC CULTURE?

Douglas A. Dixon

Queens College-City University of New York

Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Educational Research Association, San Diego, California, April 13-18, 1998

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
Office of Educational Research and Improvement
EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC)
☑ This document has been reproduced as received from the person or organization originating it.
☐ Minor changes have been made to improve reproduction quality.
• Points of view or opinions stated in this document do not necessarily represent official OERI position or policy.

PERMISSION TO REPRODUCE AND DISSEMINATE THIS MATERIAL HAS BEEN GRANTED BY

D. Dixon

TO THE EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC)

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

EA 029 247

Conceptions of Democracy and School Reform: Can 'Community' Democratic School Reforms Thrive in America's Liberal or Participatory Democratic Culture?

Educational leaders in America have been calling for greater democracy in school decision making and practice (Apple & Beane, 1995; Glickman, 1993; 1998; Levin, 1996; Meier, 1995; Sarason, 1990; 1995; 1996; Sizer, 1996; Wood, 1992). Many are explicit about the nature of these reforms and how to achieve them. Glickman (1993), for instance, has suggested that schools adopt strategies for more inclusive participation in school-wide decisions, labeled local school "shared governance," and be given greater authority to make those decisions. Establishing a school covenant and implementing a critical-study process are important for his reforms as well. Meier (1995) has connected creating smaller schools with greater participation among staff and students, greater flexibility, and better educational results. Sarason (1990, 1995, 1996) has promoted increased parental consultation and posited that local school political structures (i.e., school boards) may not be serving the needs or desires of local school constituencies. Sizer (1996) has protested that today's schools do not serve democracy well because they fail too many students by not focusing attention on a principal curricular core. Apple and Beane (1995) have suggested that schools' democratic purpose has been overtaken by the needs of business and industry. These researchers have also claimed that the conditions for establishing democratic schools, and thus, lessons for greater democratic participation in the larger society, have been subverted (see also Soder, 1996).

Many of these educational reformers discuss democratic reforms—both product and process—as if they are reflective of a universally agreed upon conception of democracy, or the 'one' most acceptable. Political scientists and educators, however, have described more than one conception of democracy based on empirical analysis and beliefs concerning human limitations, among other factors. For example, some researchers have suggested that democracy in American industrial society is 'liberal' or representative democracy (Downs, 1957; Finer, 1941; Hayek, 1944; Lippmann, 1922, 1925; Schattschneider, 1960; Schumpeter, 1976; Wilson, 1887). Others believe

that more elaborate participation in decision-making is realizable and beneficial, often labelled 'participatory' democracy (Apple & Beane, 1995; Arendt, 1963; Barber, 1992; Dahl, 1989; Frederickson, 1971; Gutmann, 1987; Held, 1987; Hyland, 1995; Pateman, 1970; Riker, 1965). Another conception of democracy has been described as "a mode of associated living, of conjoint communicated experience" (Dewey, 1916, p. 87) and its variants (Barber, 1988, 1992; Dryzek, 1996; Glickman, 1993; Putnam, 1996; VanSickle, 1979)—what this study labels 'community' democracy. Understanding different conceptions of democracy, their assumptions, and how they operate has implications for education reformers who attempt to create 'democratic' school environments, responsibilities, and citizens. Therefore, it is important to understand how the experts describe American democracy, and thus, the implications for reformers who want to establish democratic school cultures.

This paper reviewed, in part, the literature and findings of an earlier study (Dixon, 1997), which described and categorized contrasting elements of different conceptions of democracy—liberal, participatory, and community—located in an interdisciplinary exploration of the concept (see Tables 1-3, Appendix).[1] A matrix, constructed from the contrasting conceptions of democracy, was then used as a critical lens to evaluate the most recent reform ideas of three prominent democratic school reformers (Theodore Sizer, Horace's Hope; Carl Glickman, Revolutionizing America's Schools; and Henry Levin, The Accelerated Schools Resource Guide). These educational reformers were studied because they are currently working to establish greater educational democracy in large-scale networks (Accelerated Schools Project, Coalition of Essential Schools, League of Professional Schools), they have written extensively about the ties between education and its reform, in terms of democratic purpose, and there is some evidence that their writings on educational reform may not capture the complex nature of democracy and its implications for their reform ideas and implementation. The ideas of these prominent democratic school reformers were then categorized and described based on the democratic

[1]For research methodology concerns, see (Dixon, 1997).

conceptual elements. Finally, the paper turned to the problems facing the consumers of these reformers' ideas if they do not consider the pervasive liberal and participatory democratic political culture in which schools exist.

Liberal Democracy

The conception of liberal democracy has been the focus of a number of political and educational theorists (Downs, 1957; Hamilton, Madison, & Jay, in Rossiter, 1961; Hayek, 1944, 1960; Huntington, in Barber, 1992; Locke, in Laslett, 1960; Lippmann, 1922, 1925; Palmer, 1989; Schattschneider, 1960; Schumpeter, 1976; Wilson, 1887). Many of these theorists agree on a number of central elements that, to them, confirm the impossible, undesirable, and or detrimental nature of a 'classical' (or participatory) theory of democracy or of community democracy in modern industrial society. Assumptions about the disinterested, incapable, immoral, or ignorant permanent condition of the general citizenry, complexity of problems, necessary role distinctions among individuals, beliefs about limited government, protection of private property, and widespread predispositions supportive of authoritarian leaders, among others, distinguishes these adherents from those who believe in or elaborate other conceptions of democracy. Pateman (1970) has summarized and synthesized the thoughts of some of these advocates of liberal democracy.

Pateman (1970) described the writings of "orthodox theorists" who subscribe to a minimal role for citizen participation in "contemporary democracy," particularly at the national level, emphasizing "the dangers inherent in wide popular participation" (p. 1). Political system stability and conditions to maintain such stability are crucial in the theories of limited participation. These theorists argue that since complex and large-scale societies require greater organization, widespread participation is impossible; elite rule, the requisite. History too, they argue, has shown the instability of greater participation (e.g., "collapse of the Weimar Republic" and rise of totalitarian regimes "based on mass participation") (p. 2). Empirical investigations from studies of political attitudes, these theorists suggest, also buttress the argument that citizens should not

participate *en masse* (e.g., lack of interest and authoritarian attitudes, both represented especially among citizens of lower socioeconomic status). The attack on active, inclusive participation was joined especially by prominent political scientists—Schumpeter, Berelson, Dahl, Sartori, and Eckstein (p. 5)—though Dahl's (1989) writings reflect an evolving belief in greater participation through an institution he labels the "minipopulus" (p. 340).

Schumpeter (1976) provided the foundational work for these others (pp. 235-302; see also Lippmann, 1925, pp. 56-57, 62, 105). He claimed that democracy was about "method" not "ends and means" (e.g., justice) because the notion of a "common will of the people" is a myth; furthermore, rather than embodying an unrealistic role for "the people" based on a lack of understanding of issues outside their interests or experience, and thus, limited motivation to learn, democracy was really about competition among aspiring leaders and maintaining certain conditions for the electoral race to be free, fair, and nonexclusive. Participation among the general public in Schumpeter's system required only voting and discussion. The representative role, then, is trustee not delegate following the election. Citizens, collectively, are capable only of "a stampede" (Schumpeter, 1976, p. 283; see also Lippmann, 1922, p. 146).

Berelson, Dahl, Sartori, and Eckstein (all discussed in Pateman, 1970) asserted ideas which added to Schumpeter's base. Berelson suggested that several conditions are necessary for democratic survival: "intensity of conflict must be limited, the rate of change restrained, social and economic stability maintained, and a pluralist social organization and basic consensus must exit" (Pateman, 1970, p. 6). Berelson postulated too, that rather than homogeneity, the system profited from a heterogeneous citizenry. Heterogeneity contributed to system flexibility, while limited participation (based on citizen apathy and disinterest) added stability (p. 7).

Dahl (cited in Pateman, 1970, p. 8) proposed that "multiple minorities" rule in the modern-day democracy (i.e., polyarchy). According to Dahl, for polyarchy to survive, a society must maintain particular institutional relationships: elections, which provide popular responsiveness, an "extension of the number, size and diversity of the minorities that can bring their influence to bear

on policy decisions" (cited in Pateman, 1970, p. 9); electoral equality (one man, one vote); and "consensus on norms," achieved through institutions such as "the family, schools, churches, newspapers, etc." (p. 10). Achieving this consensus required adaptable personalities, not a universal 'democratic character' (p. 10).

Sartori (in Pateman, 1970) explained that the reality of democratic life was little connected to 'classical' notions of democracy. The democratic ideal would serve only to promote mediocrity, which in turn, may promote the rise of totalitarian leaders. The "real problem in democracies," to Sartori, was to maintain "the structure of authority and leadership"—a structure based on competing elites (p. 10). Thus, in practice, the democratic citizenry "react" to the proposals of political leaders because that is just the way human nature is. Sartori (in Pateman, 1970) appears to believe that human capacity allows that the citizenry "can only really understand, and take an active interest in, matters of which [they] have personal experience, or ideas that [they] can formulate for [themselves]" (p. 11). This is impossible for the average citizen in the world of politics (p. 11). Sartori believed that we must accept these "facts" on their face and argued that coercing levels of participation was an unacceptable only alternative.

Finally, Pateman (1970) discussed Eckstein's description of the conditions necessary to maintain a stable democracy. Eckstein focused specifically on "non-governmental social relationships" (e.g., familial, educational, workplace). He asserted two propositions about the necessity of authority patterns to democratic stability. First, political stability resulted from "congruent authority patterns across institutions. A congruent pattern may be taken to mean a "strong" congruency in the spheres of workplace, home, and schooling based on expected outcomes and populations involved, or a "weak" congruency in institutions closer to government. He explained that "men have a [psychological] need for firm (authoritarian) leaders and leadership," and to maintain system stability, this need must be met (p. 13). Thus, like Tarcov's (1996) explication of Aristotle's "mixed polity", Eckstein (in Pateman, 1970) appeared interested in a political system that included both participatory and authoritarian elements to meet the needs

of the citizenry (p. 13).[2] The maintenance of Eckstein's notion of a democratic system required a mixture of citizen participation and dictatorial control.

Pateman (1970) concluded that a synthesis of these liberal democratic theories results in the formation of a "contemporary theory of democracy" (p. 13). The function of minimal participation by the general citizenry in these liberal theories of democracy is protection of private interests from government actions (p. 14),[3] its purpose is not, like participatory theorists of democracy have suggested, to educate the "entire people to the point where their intellectual, emotional, and moral capabilities have reached their full potential and they are joined, freely and actively in a genuine community" (Davis [1964], cited in Pateman, 1970, p. 21).

Seventeenth century political theorist John Locke has also contributed to the demarcation of a liberal conception of democracy. In his classic treatment of civil government, Locke (Second Treatise of Government, in Lasett, 1960), elaborated a theory of government which is legitimized by the rule of law and an elected legislature, majority rule, limited and fractured power (legislative and executive), and the sovereignty of the people ("social contract"). The preservation of property, from which life, liberty and self preservation are derived, is the "chief" aim of government (pp. 327-344, 395). To Locke, the values of greatest import—private property, safety, stability (pp. 311-312, 314, 316, 321-323, 327-328, 332, 346, 377)—were attainable in greater measure outside a "state of nature" if the members of society would join together in mutual protection in a civil or "political society" (p. 395). A "state of war" existed much of the time in the state of nature due to such human weaknesses and limitations as selfishness, ignorance, apathy, whim, passion, ambition, and discontent (pp. 316, 320, 243, 246, 348, 371, 374-376, 395-396, 404, 410, 462, 463). (See also Wilson, 1887, p. 9.) According to Locke, humans did have

---

[2]See also Schattschneider (1960): "What we need is a modern definition of democracy explaining the facts of life of the operating political system, a definition that distinguishes between the democratic and antidemocratic elements" (pp. 130-131).

[3]See also Zinn (1995, pp. 76-101) or Beard (1913) for similar historical or economic perspectives on the theoretical foundations of U.S. constitutional democracy.

the capacity to reason, however, and could thus, use such powers to elect disinterested legislators, who subsequently would appoint executives (pp. 401, 423, 428). Moreover, due to the complexity and unforeseeable nature of problems, executives were given great discretion within the broad confines of law. Once joining the social pact, members of society (i.e., men in particular) relinquished "Equality, Liberty, and Executive Power they had in a state of nature... [to] better ... preserve [their] Liberty and Property" (p. 399).

Locke (in Lasett, 1960) was adamant in his belief that laws should not be made by community members outside the elected assembly (pp. 401, 408). Once members of society relinquished their individual powers to the political association, then a majority of those elected by society would pass laws everyone should follow. In pursuing the greatest good, "preservation of society," Locke believed that the:

> [l]egislature is not only the supreme power of the Commonwealth, but sacred and unalterable in the hands where the Community have once placed it; nor can any Edict of any Body else, in what Form soever conceived, or by what Power soever backed, have the force and obligation of a Law, which has not its sanction from that Legislative which the publick has choosen and appointed. For without this the Law could not have that, which is absolutely necessary to its being a Law, the consent of Society, over whom no Body can have a power to make Laws, but by their own consent. (p. 401)

If no other body could pass laws, noted Locke, then all within the civil society would have a "common establish'd Law and Judicature to appeal to, with Authority to decide Controversies between them" (p. 367). Without this common point of appeal and authority, the community remained in a state of nature, with all the accompanying predilection toward strife, instability, and insecurity. A state of war, thus, always lurked.

Early American political thinkers have also noted the limitations inherent in the nature of humanity, the need for limited and fractured government and for elections, the prominence of values such as property (and its unequal distribution resulting from the unequal faculties of men), and desirable qualities of unitary action, alacrity, secrecy, and cohesion in government decisionmaking and action.[4] Like Locke, Madison wrote in the Federalist Papers (in Rossiter,

---

[4]For greater elaboration of Publius' ideas on American democracy, see Dixon (1998).

1961) that the "first object of government" is the protection of the different and unequal faculties of men—"from which the rights of property originate" (p. 78). These different faculties give rise to the unequal and variant possession of property, which in turn, promotes contrasting interests among men. Since human reasoning is fallible, and the connection between property interests and reasoning are unavoidable, conflict among men is inevitable. "The latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of men" (Madison, in Rossiter, 1961, p. 79).

Controlling the effects of the interplay of factions, however, could be achieved through a republican form of government, according to Madison (in Rossiter, 1961, p. 80). Madison described republican government as that "which derives all its powers directly or indirectly from the great body of the people, and is administered by persons holding their offices during pleasure for a limited time period, or during good behavior" (p. 241). A "pure" form of democracy was inadequate due to the potential for both passion and interest to unite in the majority, and thus, sacrifice "the public good and private rights" and "the spirit and form of popular government" (pp. 79-80). Madison (in Rossiter, 1961) also claimed that republican principles of elected representation and a large sphere and size of population, combined, would prevent the potential for tyranny in the more base form of democracy. Elected representation would help "refine and enlarge the publics views" on the basis of the elected representative's greater wisdom, patriotism, and "love of justice" (p. 82).

A large sphere with numerous people would disable the "cabal" of a few from injuring the public good. It would also make it more difficult for "unworthy candidates to practise with success the vicious arts by which elections are too often carried" (p. 82). It would promote the selection of more virtuous leaders. On the other hand, the principle of federalism would permit the ratio of the elected to their charges to remain suitably small to effect a responsible and considerate representation (pp. 83, 325).

Madison (in Rossiter, 1961) was no less concerned with the potential for harm within government itself (p. 320). His well-known dictum, "If men were angels..." and "Ambition must

be made to counteract ambition," suggested again the undesirable propensities in the nature of humanity. As with Locke's emphasis, the legislature to Madison should predominate, but even that body must be divided into branches, rendering them "by different modes of election and different principles of action, as little connected with each other as the nature of their common functions and their common dependence on the society will admit" (p. 322). Devising constitutional structures would help achieve this (pp. 72, 310-313). The sphere of rule, encompassing a large portion of people and territory, was to contribute as well—"the larger the society...the more duly capable it will be of self-government" (p. 325).

Hamilton and Jay (in Rossiter, 1961) also shared Madison's dim view of human nature (pp. 51, 54, 56, 59, 224, 231, 451).[5] These deficiencies, according to Hamilton, could be controlled partly through structural features of the proposed American constitution. For instance, the constitution provided for a division of power among the legislative, executive, and judicial branches and their responsiveness to different constituencies (pp. 72, 368). Hamilton was also aware of the problems that divided power caused in accomplishing government ends. Therefore, he promoted a strong chief executive and centralized government to balance the division, incoherence, and delay that popular representation and fractured power would entail. Values such as efficiency (of which "unity; duration; an adequate provision for...support; and competent powers," are a part) was highly prized (p. 424). Unity of executive action, in turn, was characterized by "decision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch" (pp. 424, 452).

Moreover, Hamilton recognized good government as that which has energy enough to pursue the common good. A strong Union backed by healthy powers residing with a unitary executive were prominent values against those provided by an unwieldy, deliberative body such as the legislature. "Duration in office" promoted "personal firmness of the executive magistrate" in fulfilling his constitutional duties, stability in administration, and "greater security to the people" (pp. 431, 436-440). Finally, "a plurality in the executive," Hamilton (in Rossiter, 1961) warned,

---

[5]See also similar views held by John Adams, cited in Wood (1969, pp. 567-592).

tended to "conceal faults and destroy responsibility," whereas a single executor could be held accountable (pp. 427, 430).

Madison and Hamilton (in Rossiter, 1961) also contended that elections were central to democracy (pp. 240-242). "[W]here annual elections end, tyranny begins" (p. 330)[6]. Authority then rested with the government selected, and not with nongovernmental associations (p. 311). Thus, through elections, ultimate (though primarily negative) authority remained with the people (p. 227). Early American elections, however, did not permit all adult citizens to vote or to hold office. In Senate and presidential elections, for example, only those citizens (i.e., men) who were adjudged to have the ability and judicious disposition and/or who owned property could elect representatives to or occupy political offices. The number of representatives elected was also limited due to concerns that too many individuals involved in public deliberations would produce "confusion and intemperance" (Madison, in Rossiter, 1961, p. 342). Madison and Hamilton put more faith in government of and for, than by, the people (in Rossiter, 1961, pp. 54, 56, 59, 231, 346, 360, 379).

Madison (in Rossiter, 1961) also addressed the complex nature of knowledge and problems in society and in government and their ties to human imperfections (pp. 228-229). He argued that humans neither have attained true wisdom with respect to the science of governing nor to the subjects to which laws pertain. Limited communication skills enfeebled approximating good government even further. Thus, he noted that "[b]esides the obscurity arising from the complexity of objects and the imperfection of the human faculties, the medium through which the conceptions of men are conveyed to each other adds a fresh embarrassment" (Madison, cited in Rossiter, p. 229). Such human inadequacies and societal complexities suggested the need for a more cautious or circumscribed governing apparatus.

---

[6]Dahl (1989) has maintained that democracy requires not merely elections, but those which offer substantive choices to the electorate, and that once in power, those who rule must have power to pursue their goals.

Lippmann (1922, 1925) contended that participatory democracy was unachievable for reasons inherent in human limitations. Furthermore, information access and reinterpretation (not merely propaganda), and real world complexity made widespread participation unattainable (Lippmann, 1922, p. 18; see also Lippmann, 1925, pp. 38-39, 146-51). Too, he identified the myth of a general will or one "public opinion" (1922, p. 19). Since citizens cannot be everywhere and experience everything, they naturally have to rely on 'facts' presented by others—"the real environment is altogether too big, too complex, and too fleeting for direct acquaintance" (1922, p. 11). Moreover, even if humans could attend to all possible stimuli, they have limited capacity or disposition, to understand it, in all its complexity. Thus, according to Lippmann (1922), a citizen must construct "fictions," that is his or her own re-presentations of the environment. "[These representations] range from complete hallucination to the scientists' perfectly self-conscious use of a schematic model" (p. 10). The facts become intertwined with individual needs, and interests and emotions influence conclusions and behaviors (see also Shaver & Larkins, 1973). Furthermore, Lippmann (1925) suggested that the notion that "voters are inherently competent to direct the course of affairs [or that they are] making progress toward such an ideal" was false (pp. 38-39).

Lippmann (1922) described particular conditions that distort individual efforts to deal effectually and or comprehensively with the world. Among these he included: limited access to facts, censorship, limited social contact and time available to understand public affairs, compressed and thus distorted messages of events, technical language to explain complicated problems, and uncomfortable dissonance felt in facing problems (p. 18). For example, facts are often manipulated for war purposes. But misunderstanding also resulted from lack of access to information. Lippmann (1922) suggested that this lack of access has its roots in several causes: income limitations, occupational and social associations, and family connections.

The process and product of newsgathering also prohibited citizens from getting all the facts. While he identified the newspaper as the focus of most newsgatherers, television has overtaken this method today (Putnam, 1995; Sarason, 1996). One might, however, speculate as to whether

several of his conclusions are not still correct for the screen as for the printed word; that "words [but in the age of television—pictures too] must often stand for a whole succession of acts, thoughts, feelings, and consequences" (Lippmann, 1922, p. 42). If language is not a "perfect vehicle for meaning," pictures, too, may not guarantee that all viewers interpret the presentation the same or that the pictures may override the words accompanying them. Furthermore, as with the journalist's words, one might ask which photographer's photo was excluded or never taken—or if the photo was staged. Lippmann (1922) discussed other encumbrances to the average citizen getting needed information. The long or busy day at the factory or office does not permit of an adequate contemplative environment. His research suggested that the great majority of citizens spend no more than a quarter of an hour per day learning of public affairs (p. 37). The emotions wrought by a preoccupation with life's routines, personal interests, racial and class prejudices must also compete with attention to public affairs (pp. 48-49). "We are concerned in public affairs, but immersed in our private lives" (Lippmann, 1922, p. 36).

Efficiency, feelings of emotional security and moral rectitude, need for coherence and simplicity, and personal interests are all values served by stereotypes. Lippmann (1922) explained that humans have not the personal time, energy, or disposition to continuously update their beliefs (i. e., "stereotypes") when they are confronted with factual contradictions. But instead, to "defend" the world as they understand it, individuals select facts which bolster their preconceived notions (i.e., "code," p. 60). Facts that do not support their beliefs, embedded in personal experience and interests, are dismissed as exceptions. Furthermore, since there are a bewildering, but not comprehensive, array of facts to completely explain any phenomena, individuals can pick and choose to find support for their beliefs. Public affairs, likewise, are judged through these multi-colored lenses of human needs.

Lippmann (1922), furthermore, dismissed that there is any unified will of the people ("common will"), but instead many wills that may be satisficed through public policies. To devise a governing system that would offer platforms for all the various interests is impossible. To pursue

debate and discussion about all possible options, including all citizens, also is untenable. Yet, unity is a desirable value. Thus, the imaginative leader capitalizes on popular symbolism and coalitions, and offers policies in line with such symbolism (p. 133; see also Lippmann, 1925, p. 46-53). Further Lippmann (1922) noted that the general citizenry can only "say Yes or No" to what is proffered by a small group of policy wonks. "The essential fact remains that a small number of heads present a choice to a large group" (pp. 147-148). The type of issue decided may also determine the importance of locating the publics' interests or consent. The small policy circle can thus work its own will on some issues. These "insiders" have both familiarity with information and contacts that give them natural advantages (p. 157).

America cannot, therefore, govern itself as a participatory democracy; there is no popular sovereignty and no clearly discernable unified purpose; there is a Constitution, which granted limited rights to participate, multiple but limited spheres of governmental action, and institutions and processes to thwart the popular will (Lippmann, 1922). Moreover, citizens could govern themselves, and only then with great difficulty, through a representative system. Electing the best people for Congress or the presidency does not ensure good decisions are made. The representatives are subject to many of the same limitations as any citizen (p. 182). Lippmann (1922), therefore, claimed that the solution to the problem of democratic theory is the organization of expertise or intelligence agencies to assist elected representatives and administrators (p. 251). This democratic conception must include the "separation of function" and the education of the "insider" (who holds public office) from the "outsider" or general citizen (Lippmann, 1925, pp. 147-151).

Yankelovich (1991) maintained, however, that experts defining public choices based on intelligence ("information-as-knowledge") does not go far enough. He suggested that experts must not merely have specialized knowledge but must also clarify the values implicit in public choices. Even more, policy makers must solicit the publics' values ("values-as-knowledge") when solving public problems. How those values are implicated in the technical details of alternatives,

then, must be explained to the public. Unlike Lippmann, Yankelovich (1991) posited that citizens can learn to "work through" public issues—cognitively, emotionally, and ethically. Good democratic decisions, therefore, are not defined by amassing the most comprehensive amount of data on limited alternatives, but by identifying alternatives that are approved after consulting the publics' value priorities in the context of technical realities. This may be what Schattschneider (1960) had in mind when defining democracy as "nearly like everything else we do...a form of collaboration of ignorant people and experts" (p. 137).

Hayek (1944), like those Pateman described as "orthodox theorists", derived his liberal democratic tendencies from the evidence gathered from the operations of totalitarian regimes (e.g., Nazi Germany or Stalinist Russia). His ideas centered around several core themes. Hayek noted the central task that a not too limited laissez faire economic environment performs to ensure freedom and societal development. Competition plays a pivotal role in such a culture, ensuring flexibility, variety, and coordination to fulfill best, human needs and wants. Hayek maintained that a competitive, minimally regulated economy provided the most fertile ground to maximize individualism, tolerance, respect for others, and fulfillment of material wants. Progress in wealth, however, created a demand for more wealth for all, which if left unchecked led to liberalism's decline.

Hayek (1944) believed that greater democratic participation, the result of unhappiness with the disparity in material progress among citizens, among other factors, would lead, ultimately, to less individual flexibility due to the wider sphere that central decision making encompasses and the demand for the coordination of and ultimately the agreement (unity) on value choices. Experts are called upon to devise how the centrally adopted values are accomplished, and to have the major say in which values are adopted—central planning (pp. 53-59). As central planning came to encompass greater substantive spheres, private property and self protection (through the "Rule of Law") would become subordinated to community consensus (i.e., through options provided by central planners) on value priorities. Hayek made a critical distinction between 'law as

constitutional and fixed', and 'law as legislation that may be altered' by a majority of citizens or their representatives (in Held, 1987, p. 248); the former (Rule of Law), he believed, limits the activity of the latter (i.e., the acceptable sphere of government). Liberty, not democracy is society's ultimate end. Constitutional principles, Rule of Law, are the bulkheads of liberty.

Hayek (1960) also elaborated on two different types of equality (p. 85). He contrasted procedural equality ("equality before the law") with that which purposes to extend "the principle of equality to the rules of moral and social conduct" or what he claimed is the "chief expression of what is commonly called the democratic spirit" (p. 85). Equality in this latter sense, however, opposes liberty because it requires government to treat individuals unequally based on their differences. Thus, individual liberty is gainsayed when government imposes its own standards of appropriate conditions for all, to the end that all may achieve similar prospects (pp. 92-93).

Hayek (1960) attributed much of the egalitarian demands of equality to envy (p. 93) and or to the confusion that surrounds the concepts "moral," in contradistinction to, "assessable" merit (p. 94). Hayek (1960) argued that humans cannot reasonably adjust a person's condition based on appeals to moral merit because "we are [un]able to judge in every individual instance how well people use the different opportunities and talents given to them and how meritorious their achievements are in light of all the circumstances which have made them possible" (p. 97). Therefore, merit to Hayek (1960), is best detected through the value that one's service provides to others, and the incentive thus proffered. Such an evaluation and reward system provides the maximum liberty for all, and in turn, the highest gain to community (p. 88).

Hayek (1960) also addressed the problems inherent in attempting to equalize conditions for all. In particular, he made the distinction between natural, in contrast to, environmental differences. The former provided no avenue for correction, and the latter, little more. Environmental factors such as "family, inheritance, and education" or geography ("climate and landscape"), or "cultural and moral traditions" are commonly credited for creating differences among individuals. But as in the case of the family for instance, Heyak (1960) maintained, advantages that accrue to the

individual are more than likely the consequence of generations rather than that of immediate circumstance. Moreover, if the state precludes families from passing on accumulated wealth to future generations, Hayek contended that families will find other ways to accomplish promoting familial advantage. The state is thus hard pressed to equalize imbalances in the human condition. To Hayek, the notion of equality in the participatory conception of democracy is both illusory and unachievable because of inherent human differences and inadequate state mechanisms.

Schattschneider (1960) has implied that participatory democracy is precluded due to the nature of political organization in the United States (p. 98). The scope of democratic decisions is constrained by efforts to define many problems as private, not public; to impose an ideology on Americans such as "individualism, free private enterprise, localism, [and] privacy and economy in government" (p. 6). A variety of procedural rules disallow the conversion of private problems into public conflict. For example, businesses are not required to disclose their internal transactions under the rubric of free private enterprise. Thus, potential conflict is prevented due to lack of information. Government institutions and agents also are granted rules to keep decision processes and products out of the public eye (pp. 71-72).

Electoral organization and rules also impose simplified decisions on the electorate—voting for one of two major parties (Schattschneider, 1960). Well-organized special interests can influence party platforms, but the nature of limited competition obviates the ability of even powerful groups (e.g., big business or labor) from alienating the major party to which it identifies. The general public does not have the resources, incentives, nor the interest to organize, and thus, has little power to influence decisions. The system of political pressure reflects an upper class bias—the well-heeled, schooled, and so forth (pp. 29-36). Moreover, two party predominance, and the resulting choice simplification, in turn, reduces the potential alternatives available to the public (p. 59). This process of issue framing (choice simplification) is the most critical stage, too, since it determines the division between forces for and against a solution, "lines of cleavage" (pp. 62, 68,

73). Schattschneider writes, "*the definition of the alternatives is the supreme instrument of power*" (p. 68). The general public has had little influence here (p. 85).

Another political theorist, Downs (1957), identified the "competitive party system" as the conspicuous element of a democracy (p. ix). He attempts to explain "what parties and voters do" based on assumptions about rationality in a complex modern environment. Voter ignorance is not a barrier to rational action in Downs' theory; nor is it irrational for politicians to declare, or not, policy preferences to acquire votes. Downs (1957) defines rational action as pursuing a given end ("conscious goal") with "the least input of scarce resources"—emphasis on "processes of action" not on ends (pp. 4, 6)—an economic model of decision making. Moreover, since the "political function of elections in a democracy...is to select a government," rational behavior is defined in terms of achieving this outcome (p. 7).

Conditions underlying Downs' economic theory of democracy include: an atmosphere of uncertainty (a central axiom); periodic elections; each adult citizen having one vote; the party receiving the most votes, controls government and has "unlimited freedom of action, within the Constitution;" opposition parties are free to compete—no government restrictions on free speech and campaigning; voting rights must be enforced; private property; and due process of law (pp. 12, 18). Individuals are assumed to act in their own interests.

A central notion Down's (1957) explicated in his democratic theory is the "atmosphere of uncertainty" (p. 81), that is, the lack of knowledge about the course of events. Political actors (i.e., voters and parties) deal with this uncertainty differently based on their possession of different subsets of information and "contextual knowledge" (p. 79). Information, to Downs, is "data about current developments" based in contextual knowledge. Contextual knowledge is "cognizance of the basic forces relevant to some given field of operations" (p. 79). Downs assumed that all men possess the capacity for reason—"facility with the processes of logical thought and the principles of causal analysis" (p. 79). But the problems underlying a more fully participatory democracy appeared to be rooted in uncertainty, voters' and parties' self interests

(minimizing resource inputs for a given end), and the efficient (rational) division of labor that these conditions promote. Uncertainty requires political actors to simply their environment. "Uncertainty...helps convert democracy into representative government. Another powerful force which has the same effect is the division of labor. To be efficient, a nation must develop specialists in discovering, transmitting, and analyzing popular opinion.... These specialists are representatives" (Downs, 1957, p. 89). Depending on the demographic and geographic makeup of the political region, the government representatives will reflect these earlier distinctions. Since uncertainty pervades the political actors' worlds, and different actors possess different levels of information and contextual knowledge, not all opinions or voters, are equal. Rational governments (controlling party) will seek to accommodate those "intermediaries" who possess greater understanding of the will of publics to reduce costs. In turn, these representatives will seek to persuade others to support a policy in line with their own interests. The government, seeking to maximize votes (Downs' assumption), will try to appease those opinion leaders to the point where maximum vote gain is outweighed by marginal cost in votes, in action coordination.

Voters too, according to Downs (1957), will simplify decision making by looking to agents for information. To gain the right type of information (i.e., self interest), the source of information must value similar "selection principles" as the seeker. To lower costs of acquiring information, citizens will be served best by locating free sources of information or using "partially subsidized" sources (p. 229). The free sources include well-read friends and library newspapers; subsidized sources are not as likely to match the selection principles as well, however. The political world is simplified also when ideologies are adopted by parties. These ideologies then reduce information costs for parties and voters (p. 100). Importantly, too, Downs suggested that the distribution of political opinions affected the potential for or maintenance of democracy when parties attempt to adopt winning coalitions.

The foregoing discussion of liberal democratic elements contrasts sharply with the community and participatory democratic perspectives. Beliefs about human nature, government, civic

participation, information access and dissemination, problems and knowledge, expanse of governance, and value priorities, in the liberal democratic mind, all point to the necessary and desirable circumscribed political sphere. Participatory democrats, on the other hand, contend that more comprehensive political participation is desirable and possible. It is to this conception that we turn next.

Participatory Democracy

Several scholars have identified the roots of the participatory conception of democracy in the writings of eighteenth and nineteenth century theorists or in the theories and practices of the city-states of Greece in the fifth century B. C. (Dahl, 1989; Held, 1987; Hyland, 1995; Pateman, 1970). Scant evidence has been uncovered from the Athenian example to give a full description of its framework (Hyland, 1996, p. 8). Dahl (1989), however, distinguished between the ideal and actual practice of Greek, or more accurately, Athenian democracy. Characteristics of the ideal participatory system included: a high level of shared interests among the people—personal and public—a largely homogeneous polis (e.g., economic resources, religious beliefs, language), small size of territory and population, institutions for assembling and directly deciding issues and the ability to do so, participation in the administration of institutions, and self sufficiency of the city for maximum autonomy (pp. 18-19).

Such democratic ideals were not demonstrated in actual practice, however. Dahl (1989) and Tarcov (1996) suggested that Athenian democracy fell far short of many notions to which present-day democracy advocates would adhere (see Gutmann, 1987; Hyland, 1995; Pateman, 1970). For instance, political participation, or citizenship, was restricted to Athenian white males above the age of 20 who qualified through hereditary privilege. Also, elected representatives performed many of the executive functions of government (Madison, cited in Rossiter, 1961, pp. 386-387). Women, slaves, and resident "aliens" were excluded not only from participation in administrative posts and legislative acts, but were denied other rights such as owning land (Dahl, 1989, p. 22). Dahl (1989) noted, too, that Athenian democracy was exclusive "externally,"

meaning only those citizens residing within Athens territorial boundaries, could share in the democratic prerogatives. Thus, what many democrats today would refer to as universal rights—"claims to freedom [or] equality," for example, were not accorded to those living outside the city-state. Freedom, itself, "meant the rule of law and participation in the decision-making process, not the possession of inalienable rights" (p. 23). The reality of Athenian democracy was probably that ambition, kinship, and friendship factions weighed more heavily in how and why decisions were made than well-reasoned or altruistic analyses of the common good.

Held (1987) has also reviewed the historical roots of the participatory conception of democracy, specifically, classical, developmental, and direct democratic notions (p. 5). He suggested that a number of conditions were propitious for the development of greater political participation in the Greek city-states.

> [G]rowth of land and overseas trade...expansion of population...economic autonomy of small and medium sized farmers as well as some categories of peasants...important changes in military organization which made, among others, moderately prosperous farmers and peasants central to the community's defence [possibly the most important change]...growth in literacy...innovations in the 'constitutions' of city-states...compact communities...[and] easy communication.... (Held, 1987, p. 14)

Thus, aside from characteristics of the population, necessary institutions, and particular notions of democratic ideals and willingness to act on those notions, social, economic, educational, and military conditions may have been prerequisites to initiating and maintaining a participatory democratic system. After reviewing Xenophon's writings on a notable Athenian naval battle, Held (1987) goes so far as to say that these conditions may have been the most critical to democratic success, not the constitutional framework since public speaking ability, webs of informal communication, violently oppositional factions, and susceptibility of the assembly to passions of the moment all worked to undercut formal laws (pp. 20, 27). Plato's story of "the ship's captain" also supports this view (Held, 1987, p. 29). General conditions, such as an economy based on slavery and the circumscribed role of women as homemakers, permitted time for citizens to contemplate the concerns of the polis; moreover, citizens were paid for the services they rendered to public affairs.

In line with these limitations, Held (1987) maintained that certain attitudes or predispositions which guided behavior were integral to Athenian democracy. For example, citizens had to be treated equally "before the law" (though equality translated only to those who maintained a certain status), ability counted above all in determining public personnel decisions, tolerance for differences was crucial, keeping well-informed of public affairs was a priority, deliberation prior to action was paramount, good decision-making hinged on the best arguments, all citizens could and should participate in public affairs, the *demos* was sovereign, and the "good life" was achievable only through participation in the public realm (pp. 16-17).

Aristotle (in Held, 1987) described some of the institutional structures and processes of ancient democracy. Democracy was defined in constitutional terms, and its guiding principles were "[r]uling and being ruled in turn", "numerical equality", predominance of the majority, and maximizing freedom in private life—though freedom of non-citizens was circumscribed since they had no voice in the assembly (Held, 1987, p. 19). Continual turnover in public office, selection for office by lot with no opportunity for re-election, and the critical import of the assembly for unrestricted deliberation were constitutional hallmarks of the democratic system. Any issues of significance were deliberated and decided by the assembly. Voting was used to decide issues if consensus could not be reached.

A second influence on the participatory conception of democracy, Held (1987) elaborated, was what he termed developmental in nature. An outgrowth of the eighteenth and nineteenth century decline in major institutions in society, religious and political, democracy came to be seen as "a (if not *the*) central mechanism in the development of people" (p. 72). Held (1987) attributed the characteristics of developmental democratic notions to three theorists: Rousseau, Wollstonecraft, and John Stuart Mills, though Mill's ideas fit more neatly in what was described as the liberal democratic conception. Rousseau, one of its leading proponents, described government as a necessary social compact to overcome the obstacles individuals faced when driven from the state of nature, and thus, when precluded from attaining happiness. "Human beings came to realize

that the development of their nature, the realization of their capacity for reason, the fullest experience of liberty, could be achieved only by a social contract which established a system of cooperation through a law-making and law-enforcing body" (cited in Held, 1987, p. 74).

To Rousseau, sovereignty remained with the individual, yet he maintained that citizens had to meet together to decide issues and enact laws. "[T]he idea of self-rule [was] posited as an end in itself" (cited in Held, 1987, p. 75); the achievement of liberty was intricately bound with the right to self rule. Liberty, in turn, was tied to equality. Therefore, individuals had to attain some measure of economic independence. The right to accumulate private property was not unlimited since vast differences in holdings would lead to inequality, and thus, to a lack of liberty and "material security and independence of mind" (p. 76). Legislative and executive institutions were required but their functions would effect different roles; the legislative, to reflect input and agreement of the general citizenry; the executive, to achieve specific goals through elected or appointed administrators. A separate executive agency was necessary to achieve values such as "expediency" and coordination (p. 77).

Like the contrast between the Athenian democratic ideal and practice, Rousseau's ideas also had their inconsistencies. Self governance, at times, gave way to the values of administrative efficiency; the 'general will' overruled the pre-eminence of self-rule; and the unlimited scope of decision-making precluded safeguarding minority rights. Furthermore, like the Athenian model, neither women nor the poor enjoyed participation in decision-making assemblies. Moreover, Rousseau's conception was created for "a non-industrial community...like his native 'republic of Geneva'" (p. 79).

Wollstonecraft also viewed participation in public affairs as critical to the development of the individual's capacities to reason and to act morally (Held, 1987). But she was primarily concerned with broadening such participation to include women, particularly those in the middle class, and the laboring class of men. Men and women, she argued, possess different interests but similar capabilities to reason. Wollstonecraft also connected liberty to participate with the freedom from

paternal oppression, non-traditional views of a 'women's place' and predispositions, and adequate educational, experiential, and career opportunities. Like Rousseau, she believed economic independence was a prerequisite to women's participation, both through voting and in public deliberations.

A third major influence in the development of a participatory conception of democracy, according to Held (1987), was the "direct democracy" movement stirred by Karl Marx. Marx conception of a fully participatory democracy hinged on the disestablishment of private ownership of the means of production. Such private ownership lead to unequal social, economic, and political relationships. Unequal relationships doomed the realization of liberty and freedom. The role of the state (and government) had to be adjusted to eliminate the dominant economic class—capitalists—at least until no government was necessary. Thus, in what has become known as the orthodox Marxian view, the state had to be destroyed, or infiltrated, to bring about the conditions necessary for the elimination of class warfare. A "'pyramid' structure of direct democracy," where individuals were accountable to one another and representative of all interests would serve until society no longer needed government. Thus, Marxian ideas, might be reflective of community democracy, discussed later, as well.

It is apparent from Held's (1987) review of Rousseau, Wollstonecraft, and Marx, that these theorists believed that participation led to fulfillment and greater happiness, that individuals had the right, even the obligation, to participate in public affairs (though Marx was the most inclusive), and that particular social, economic, educational, and personal conditions (e.g., time, financial independence, and predispositions) were crucial to participating fully in democratic life. On the other hand, what was missing in each of these frameworks was a fully explicated model of democracy, including a full delineation of human capabilities (e.g., interests, abilities, natures), requisite political boundaries and scope for decision-making, necessary institutions, size of population and territory, individual rights and duties, required processes or procedures, and value commitments. Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, there is some evidence that many of the

prescriptions were at odds with one another (e.g., self and majority rule, unlimited scope of collective decision-making and individual liberty and autonomy). Moreover, there are clear gaps in logic with other points, Marx's claim that government was needed only to mediate class conflict—ignoring other spheres of conflict (sexism, racism, ageism, discrimination against the disabled, and so forth), and thus, the need for continued government. The lack of a comprehensive model may stem from the mixed bag of competing or incongruent values that comes to the fore when any framework of a democratic order is constructed. The internal inconsistency of any given set of institutions, processes, size of body politic or political territory, or necessary conditions, among other factors, led to conflicting value outcomes.

Hyland (1995) also elaborated the historical roots of participatory democracy. As with Held (1987), Rousseau was Hyland's starting point in illuminating a conception of democracy which included certain values that many present-day democrats believe are crucial to participation in governance, in particular "equal effective rights to participate in the determination of the authoritatively binding outcomes" (pp. 53, 67). The idea of equal effective rights encompassed two dimensions according to Hyland (1995). The quantitative dimension measures the inclusiveness of participation (a ratio of who participates to whom the decisions affect); and the qualitative dimension, the nature of participation within several "moments" of decision-making: agenda setting, deliberation, the choice, and implementation (pp. 56-57). The qualitative dimension also included a minimal level of individual economic independence and a predisposition for questioning the way things are (p. 214). Moreover, Hyland argued that proportional systems approximate equal effective rights more than majoritarian systems since decisions rarely consist of only two options (pp. 76-100; see also Downs, 1957; Schattschneider, 1960)

Pateman (1970), too, has traced the roots of the idea of participatory democracy—exposing the "myth of a 'classical theory of democracy'" (p. 17). Noting the emerging calls for greater political participation across countries, and especially during the 1960's by college students in the U.S., Pateman described what participation means in terms of democratic theorists such as

Rousseau, John Stuart Mill, and G.D.H. Cole.[7] The foundation of all three theorists' ideas is that "there is an interrelationship between the authority structure of institutions and the psychological qualities and attitudes of individuals, and that the major function of participation is an educative one," both in attitudes and skills (pp. 27, 42). The first two writers she described as "examples of 'classical' democratic theorists;" the last, as one who "developed a theory of participatory democracy that not only included and extended [the classical theories, but did so] in the context of a modern, large-scale, industrialized society" (p. 21).

Pateman (1970) first examined Rousseau's ideas. She called Rousseau "the theorist *par excellence* of participation," elaborating that his "entire political theory hinged on the individual participation of each citizen in political decision making" and was rooted in the "psychological effect on the participants" (p. 22).[8] The prime purpose of the political system was an "educative one" (psychological effect)—"designed to develop responsible, individual social and political action through the effect of the participatory process" (p. 25). The educative effect encompassed learning about interdependence, the link between private and public interests, and building greater capacity for participation itself, and thus, for constructing freedom. Representative institutions, in Rousseau's theory, negated one's full development or pursuit of freedom (p. 26). Moreover, participation in decision making, according to Pateman's (1970) understanding of Rousseau, functioned to increase the value of one's freedom, to make collective decisions more acceptable and to create a feeling of inclusion in a community, a sense of belonging.

Pateman (1970) described J.S. Mill's evolutionary thinking from that of supporting representative institutions (as did his father, James Mill, and Jeremy Bentham), to creating an

---

[7]Cole's ideas fit more neatly under the community democratic conception because he advocated participation primarily in the nongovernmental realm. This activity, however, was considered helpful to support the characteristics of greater participation in other spheres.

[8]Rousseau's theory on the best political system has been subject to widely varying interpretations; so too, J.S. Mill's evolution of thought. Dahl's ideas have also evolved over time, for instance, his thoughts on polyarchy to minipopulus.

incoherent mix of participatory and representative institutions (e.g., weighted votes to favor the more educated or giving attention to "good government" defined as 'well-run government' along side its educative function, pp. 28, 32). Mill also diverged from Rousseau's conception of participation, explicating the role of the majority of citizens as voters (inferior to the educated elite—"plural voting"), and elected representatives as discussants, of an agenda suggested by "special commissions appointed by the Crown" (p. 32). But Mill maintained that participation must be nurtured in "local societies" to enable the educative principle to work in the national realm. His emphasis on local participation was shaped by de Tocqueville's writings on the evils of centralization and mass society. Mill expanded 'local societies' to include not only local government but also the workplace and other associations.

G.D.H. Cole is another theorist who Pateman (1970) identified as critical for understanding the theory of participatory democracy; she noted that "Cole's theory is a theory of associations," and not association inside of government but in other organizations, especially the workplace (p. 36). To Cole, those who participate in democracy must be guided by an associational purpose—'functional representation.' The workplace was an obvious starting point because citizens have some experience in this sphere, and thus, can participate competently in decisions about that association. While representatives can be chosen to make decisions, those who choose them (members of social guilds) can be integrally involved in decision making since they have in-depth knowledge of the association. These "functional associations...can continuously advise, criticize and, if necessary, recall the representative" (p. 40). This authority structure promoted both the necessary conditions for democracy to flourish (e.g., "abolition of the fear of unemployment" and "inequality in security of tenure") and the training in democratic participation; its outcome was thought to be greater efficiency and the release of "untapped reserves of energy and initiative in the ordinary man.... [T]he profit motive...would be replaced by the motive of free service [toward] the benefit of the whole community" (p. 40).[9]

---

[9]See Lippmann (1922) for counterarguments (pp. 189-194).

Pateman (1970) maintained that "[t]he theory of participatory democracy stands or falls on two factors: the educative function of participation, and the crucial role of industry" (p. 44). She explored the empirical evidence for the claim that increasing participation has an educative effect in the political realm, voluntary organizations, and the workplace—including diverse types of industry and among all levels of workers (p. 47). Pateman found in these studies that enhanced opportunities for participation do produce higher levels of personal confidence and efficacy which pay off in several ways—efficiency, productivity, and high morale. Factors associated with low level opportunities to participate (less skilled jobs, authoritarian family structures, low end incomes, non-cooperative work assignments, less control over work, multiple layers of supervisors) worked to produce the opposite effect (p. 49). Moreover, there appeared to be an accumulative effect, which was important since individuals existed in many associations. And school children, and others, are affected not merely by school associations but also by family and other authority structures.

Pateman (1970) also explored specific variants of participation: pseudo, partial and full (pp. 68-71). These helped to clarify whether different elements of the decision making process have indeed been modified, and thus, to determine better whether greater participation is accounted for by the changes. An important distinction between pseudo and the other forms of participation is whether employees have "possession of the requisite information on which they can base their decision" (p. 69). Possessing equal power to decide the outcome of decisions differentiated full from partial participation" (pp. 70-71).

In spite of the theories that suggested that full participation, what Hyland (1995) described as "equal effective participation," would be required to produce the desired educative effect, Pateman (1970) noted that even partial participation can produce increased feelings of efficacy; this higher level, however, may not be sufficient to promote effective participation in the national political realm due to other significant factors (p. 74). The educative effect included numerous other components that may be left unaffected by inclusion through partial participation.

Pateman's (1970) examination of the evidence in three industrial examples where greater opportunities for participation (including a high level of partial participation) were provided did not confirm that participants will have more knowledge of, interest in, or participate more in decision making in higher level areas of decision-making, especially among low-level workers (pp. 79-82). Pateman posited that this may be the result of training 'ordinary workers' to be obedient. Moreover, low-level workers may believe themselves ill-suited to make decisions based on their limited knowledge about those issues.

Pateman (1970) also reviewed evidence of participatory worker councils in Yugoslavia. She found that factors such as limited expertise and influential leaders, denied greater levels of participation (p. 97).[10] Pateman concluded that to overcome such problems may require connecting experiences in participation at lower level areas of decision-making—where workers desire to participate, possess more relevant knowledge, and do participate more—to upper levels. Also, sharing greater information about decisions and decision processes may be critical. Pateman suggested that worker attributes (e.g., amount of general education or industrial experience) may make a difference to the potential for influence of a director or an expert (p. 96). Salience of decisions (personal concerns of workers) may also affect their participation. She concluded that "whether or not the ideal of the earlier 'classical' theorists of participatory democracy can be realized remains very much an open and live question" (p. 102).

Community Democracy

The foundation of a third conception of democracy has been laid or noted, sometimes indirectly, by theorists in the participatory and liberal schools of democracy, by more recent democratic scholars such as Putnam (1995) and Dryzek (1996), and by notable literary and historical figures such as Henry David Thoreau (e.g., Civil Disobedience), American revolutionary leader Samuel Adams and the Sons of Liberty (Committees of Correspondence or the Boston Tea

---

[10]For similar arguments on schools, see Jennings (1981).

Party) (LaBaree, 1966; Morgan & Morgan, 1962), or Martin Luther King (e.g., non-violent political action, "I Have a Dream Speech," and the March on Washington) (Sitkoff, 1981).

This conception's most prominent proponent in the field of education may be John Dewey (1916). The ideas in his classic work Democracy and Education, are critical to an understanding of community democracy. The phrase most illustrative of this democratic conception is Dewey's (1916): "democracy is more than a form of government; it is primarily a mode of associated living, of conjoint communicated experience" (p. 87). Moreover, more recent work by Barber (1988), Kerr (1996), and VanSickle (1979, 1983), among others, have helped to more clearly define analytical elements of this conception.

The central values of community democracy include nongovernment directed collective action, shared understanding, open dialogue, cooperation, cooperative problem solving, dilution of status constraints on collaboration, development of a common history, and nurturing others and community. At most, this conception has only an indirect connection to formal government action but may have a significant impact on it nonetheless. Some of the most glaring contrasts between liberal and participatory conceptions of democracy and that of community democracy, can be found in several writings by Henry David Thoreau. For instance, in Slavery in Massachusetts, Thoreau (1854) wrote:

> What is wanted is men, not of policy, but of probity—who recognize a higher law than the Constitution, or the decision of the majority. The fate of the country does not depend on how you vote at the polls—the worst man is as strong as the best at that game; it does not depend on what kind of paper you drop into the ballot-box once a year, but on what kind of man you drop from your chamber into the street every morning (p. 316). [And on government decisions concerning slavery:] Recent events will be valuable as a criticism on the administration of justice in our midst, or, rather, as showing what are the true resources of justice in any community. *It has come to this, that the friends of liberty, the friends of the slave, have shuddered when they have understood that his fate was left to the legal tribunals of the country to be decided.* (p. 310, italics added)

In his essay, Civil Disobedience, Thoreau (1849) was no less scathing about the problems with formal democracy and the need for community democracy. He wrote:

> Is a democracy, such as we know it, the last improvement possible in government?...I please myself with imagining a State at least which can afford to be just to all men, and to treat the individual with respect as a neighbor....[allowing a few citizens] to live aloof from it, not

> meddling with it, nor embraced by it, *who fulfilled all the duties of neighbors and fellow men.* (p. 301, italics added)

Thoreau's refusal to pay a tax to support the U.S. Government's war with Mexico or for its protecting the institution of slavery is well-known, as well as is his incarceration for the act. His statement about his jailing is related to the problems of equating government with democracy, "Under a government which imprisons any unjustly, the true place for a just man is also a prison" (1849, p. 289). For similar, more recent American civil rights arguments and strategies ("the jail-in") see Sitkoff, 1981, p. 74).

Thoreau defined a just society and state in terms of relationships with others and with individual liberty. Instead of an anarchist, as some have labeled him (Hyland, 1995, p. 141), Thoreau's writings suggest he is a community democrat. He writes (and speaks) publicly to persuade his fellow citizens—encouraging dialogue. He acts from a sense of 'social' consciousness and from a desire to reduce status constraints. He aims to create a nurturing society. His action is non-governmental. His writings reflect that he is cooperative, first and foremost, with the oppressed (A Plea for Captain John Brown,Thoreau, 1859).

Dewey (1916) may be the best foundational source for the concept of community democracy. He compares the processes and products of government by philosopher-kings, or for individualism, or for nationalistic aims of the state, with a democracy whose processes and results reflect cooperation, mutual understanding, and shared interest, without the concomitant rewards or punishment that formal government rule requires or imposes. Dewey (1916) clarified the interrelationship among community, individual lives, a healthy society, and democratic progress, using the family as an illustration.

> If we take...the kind of family life which illustrates the standard, we find that there are material, intellectual, aesthetic interests in which all participate and that the progress of one member has worth for the experience of other members....the family enters intimately into relationships with [other groups]...and plays a due part in the political organization and in return receives support from it. In short, there are many interests consciously communicated and shared; and there are varied and free points of contact with other modes of association. (p. 83)

Dewey (1916) went on to suggest that for members of the group (i.e., community) to have many "values in common," all within the group must share in opportunities equally for interaction, for "shared undertakings and experiences." "Otherwise, [he continued], the influences which educate some into masters, educate others into slaves" (p. 84). The wealthy as well as the poor are injured by not sharing in mutual experiences with one another since such variety, to Dewey, challenged thought (p. 85). Shared experiences and understandings obliterate "those barriers of class, race, and national territory which keep men from perceiving the full import of their activity" (p. 87). Moreover, Dewey believed that a recognition by community members of their common interests is a "factor in social control" and a springboard to more supple societal adjustment—two traits Dewey believed to be "precisely characteristic of the democratically constituted society" (p. 86). Dewey and others (e.g., William Wirt) proved that this philosophy of education was capable of implementation at his Chicago Lab Schools and in schools in the Gary Plan (Cremin, 1961, pp. 135-136, 154-155).

Barber (1988) also elaborated more clearly what community democracy entails. He included in his essay phrases such as "common deliberation" and "common work" (pp. 296, 299-302). Barber maintained that America has lost its desire to meet and discuss public problems. Various groups (e.g., "political clubs, churches, farm associations, even barber shops," p. 296) that used to play the role of community forums have quit performing that function. Emphasis on community democracy, to Barber, required that members of society believe in the intrinsic—not merely instrumental— value of block association, school board, town, or neighborhood meetings. Barber (1988) also suggested that "[a]nyone who has attended these types of meetings...will recognize how many needs unconnected with the policy objectives of the organization can be met by the fellowship, communication, and sense of commonality that can envelop a spirited gathering" (p. 296). Barber recommended that government monies be spent on reinvigorating forums "for public thinking" and for "civic education" (p. 296).

Moreover, Barber (1988) described how citizens could work together to perform valued, but unpaid, public service for community embetterment. Engaging citizens to work together to perform such services as a "block watcher's association" or child care, or in "drug prevention, family assistance, and remedial education" have demonstrated success. Not only is citizen participation helpful in these ventures, it is crucial (p. 301). Furthermore, these efforts at common work reinforce attitudes of self sufficiency, both for individuals and communities. Moreover, he pointed to "laws already on the books" which can be enforced only with the "understanding, consent, and participation" of members of the community (p. 301). Pressman and Wildavsky (1984) discussed similar ideas but with regard to government policy implementation by government agencies.

Barber (1992) has also discussed the importance of the development of a common history and shared understanding, elements of community democracy. He claimed that the American story is about neither pristine purity nor ignominy that some of its proponents and critics have suggested. The American story, rather, is a tale about high ideals embedded in the promises made in historical documents like the Declaration of Independence or Constitution, and also about the continuing inability of Americans to deliver fully on such promises. The shared understanding is everyone's grasp of both America's shortcomings and its ideals; the development of a common history is the continuing saga of attaining America's ideals. Barber (1992) wrote that "[t]o be an American is not to have secured equality and justice, but only—with the help of a story of unprecedented aspiration—still to hope and to struggle for them" (p. 77). Moreover, Barber exhorted that "America has always been a tale of peoples trying to be a People, a tale of diversity and plurality in search of unity" (p. 41). Thus, community democracy is a conscious understanding of and striving for *e pluribus unum*.

Dryzek (1996) has differentiated "democratic life in civil society [from that of] democratic life in the state" (p. 482). He posited that democratic theorists have focused too much on the state and that democratic notions must extend "to the polity beyond the state" (though he suggests the

state cannot be ignored since it will have "major implications for the democratic vitality of civil society") (p. 475). In particular, Dryzek argued that for theorists to understand the fullest nature of democracy working in a society, they must analyze the public space created in "civil society" (p. 475).

Dryzek (1996) defined the civil society "as all social interaction not encompassed by the state or the economy.... [I]t consists of voluntary political association oriented by a relationship to the state, but not seeking any share in state power; that is, association is self-limiting" (p. 481). Furthermore, Dryzek posited that self-limiting does not mean powerless, but that other avenues of action, beyond the electoral, is utilized. For instance, Dryzek maintained that the rhetoric of Martin Luther King, feminists, or environmentalists, has changed the nature of debate surrounding issues of concern to them (p. 481). Power exercised in the civil society is connected with "communicative power" as set against "administrative power." More specifically, communicative power (Habermas, cited in Dryzek, 1996) "is diffuse and pervasive, felt in the way terms are defined and issues are framed, not in the direct leverage of one actor over another" (p. 481).

Moreover, when defining civil society in functionalist terms, "as public action in response to failure in government and the economy" (Dryzek, 1996, p. 482), its focus is ultimately problem solving, "not merely talk." Alternatives to government action taken by those citizens who contribute to civil society, Dryzek concluded, have included "support groups," "community boards," and "boycotts." Civil society also is non-exclusionary because it is essentially self-regulated (p. 482). That is, "the 'elites' populating these oases [in civil society] are self-selected and can come from any social class" (p. 482). Most importantly, civil society is the most free society because participants are not constrained by formal system structures (e.g., electoral coalition strategies and compromises, access to office, repression of dissenters for party unity).

Finally, Dryzek (1996) noted the constraints placed on the civil society when states are repressive ("active exclusion" or "authoritarian liberalism") (p. 482). In the case of active exclusion, any sign of organization may be snuffed out by state leaders (e.g., Stalin); in the case of

authoritarian liberalism, "maximization of the role of market in organizing society, in combination with attacks on the conditions of public association in civil society" curtails an active civil society. On the other hand, a too inclusionary state may also diminish the potential for a fully realized civil society by co-opting the most aggressive actors. These various conditions help dictate the type of strategy that groups in the civil society employ to gain influence in society (i.e., communicative and/or inclusionary).

Putnam (1995) has explored a concept tangentially related to Dryzek's civil society: "social capital" (p. 664). Putnam (1995) defined social capital to mean "features of social life—networks, norms, and trust—that enable participants to act together more effectively to pursue shared objectives," [and more specifically] that serve civic ends" (pp. 664-665). Social capital is distinguished from "political participation" in that it focuses primarily on "our relations with one another," not on "our relations with political institutions" (p. 665). Examples of social capital include "[b]owling in a league or having coffee with a friend" (p. 665).

Putnam (1995) found in his study of Italian local government that "citizen engagement in community affairs" influenced powerfully "the performance of government and other social institutions" (p. 664). Too, his theory of social capital suggested that "social trust and civic engagement are strongly correlated" (p. 665). Putnam's study of social relations in the United States suggested that social capital has declined dramatically over several decades, likely due to the dominance of television in Americans' lives and "the disintegration of marriage" (pp. 671, 679).

VanSickle (1979) reviewed and evaluated a significant amount of research related to status characteristics, their constraints on fully functioning decisionmaking efforts of groups and individuals, and status neutralization, utilizing small group work in schools. While much of the literature he summarized gave no definitive answers, it did provide sufficient support to continue research in improving school outcomes (research particularly related to social relations among individuals across different demographic groups) among all students by creating more equal and

harmonious social relationships within schools. Such a goal is one of the prominent values of community democracy.

Specifically, VanSickle (1979) discussed the likelihood that decisions made by small groups with a pattern of "widely distributed participation" and mutual respect for potential contributions of different status groups would promote decisions that "are likely to be correct more often than when one person decides alone" (p. 2). Current stereotyping, based on race, sex, or ability, for instance, appears to prevent such patterns and inhibits the healthy development of all persons' fullest potential in school, especially with regard to performance evaluations (self and others), participation rates, and student productivity, among others (p. 29). VanSickle (1979) also noted research on activities such as games and teams and peer modeling which have demonstrated the potential to alleviate status barriers. Furthermore, efforts to introduce more "diffuse liking structures," in theory, may contribute to greater participation and less unequal relationships in classrooms.

Kerr (1996) has also elaborated elements of community democracy. She maintained that nurturing one another is the crucial element in democracy. To nurture individuals and society, Kerr concluded that citizens must go beyond merely protecting rights through appeals to the state. She maintained that nurturing one another does not necessarily include schools that pronounce their primary purpose as preparing children for a technologically advanced future or restricting curricula to a narrow focus, and thus, excluding the opportunity to explore individual differences (p. 52). Nurturing others and self also cannot be confused with dominating relationships masked in romantic or paternal love, nor can it be mistaken for protecting the underclass from economic oppression. Rather, to Kerr, nurturing others and self is accomplished primarily through "recognition, mutual respect, and trust" (p. 55).

These three components of nurturing one another, to Kerr (1996), require that we "attend to the content and ways in which [individuals], as selves, experience their lives" (p. 48). These experiences reflect the diversity that is humanity. Individuals (Kerr spoke specifically of children

telling their stories to teachers) must be willing to trust others to share intimate details. Storytellers become vulnerable since such personal tales can be used to help or to hurt by those listening. When used to help individuals become a part of one anothers' lives, stories take on the quality of shared history, and lead to greater feelings of belongingness, mutual respect and understanding, and greater trust. Kerr went further in declaring that relationships are borne more likely from smaller "institutions and associations...the number whom we can know by first name or the number with whom we can interact in the course of, say a month" (p. 55). Kerr continued, "the hope of a rich civic society, of democracy, of nurture," lies in the development of "our extended families" including neighborhoods, churches, or other communities (p. 55).

Reviewing Robert Putnam's study of democracy in Italy, Kerr (1996) concluded that building a civic community and thus democracy required:

> civic engagement [whereby] self-interest is 'alive to'...the interests of others; political equality [that is, building] horizontal relations of reciprocity and cooperation [with an understanding that the absence of such permits individuals to gain power at the expense of the wider community]; solidarity, trust, and tolerance, [in which] civic participation...relies heavily on a strong notion of civic virtue consisting of being helpful, respectful, and trustful toward one another; [and] dense networks of social cooperation, [or] rich congeries of voluntary associations through which people develop 'habits of cooperation, solidarity, and public-spiritedness.' (p. 58)

In particular, she noted, like Dryzek (1996) and Putnam (1995), that collaborating with one another "outside the market" or "beyond our role as [political] citizens" is essential to democracy. Creating voluntary associations consisting of a culturally, economically, racially, or otherwise, diverse group to learn from one another and to help frame problems and their solutions is critical (p. 65). Such cooperation will require that we move beyond various myths (e.g., "the Needful Other," or "Nurture as Intervention for Targeted Populations"), and refocus on relational features such as dignity and the self (pp. 56-62). Kerr (1996) claimed that this can only come with our acknowledgement that such efforts to refocus are rooted in civic society (p. 63).

Conceptions of Democracy as An Analytical Tool

The foregoing discussion of various conceptions of democracy demonstrated the different assumptions, attitudes, and values that political and educational theorists bring to their

understanding of democracy. From these theories and conclusions, among others, specific elements of different conceptions of democracy were constructed. These contrasting elements produced twenty-four specific categories across three democratic conceptions (liberal, participatory, and community) (see Tables 1-3, Appendix). The eight elements included: beliefs concerning the nature of individuals and of the masses, government, information access and distribution, mode of participation, nature of problems and knowledge, size of governing territory or population, and value priorities.

Because some elements may be similar across democratic conceptions (e.g. nature of individuals and masses in the participatory and community democracy conceptions), *the distinction between or among conceptions relied upon the constellation of elements within a conception*. For instance, participatory and community democracy, while similar with regard to their assumptions about human nature, differed in their attitudes toward government or mode of participation. Thus, it is the constellation of elements which was helpful in distinguishing between various conceptions of democracy, not merely a single contrasting element. Tables 1 through 3 (Appendix) describe in detail the contrasting elements across different conceptions of democracy.

The next section discussed the most recent ideas of three prominent democratic educational reformers: Theodore Sizer, Coalition of Essential Schools; Carl Glickman, League of Professional Schools; and Henry Levin, Accelerated Schools Project. The analysis was accomplished through the use of the contrasting democratic conceptions described above; that is, the matrix of democratic conceptual elements was used as a thematic lens to review the most recent major reform ideas written by these three educators. Ideas of these reformers were coded (e.g., L-MP, for 'liberal—mode of participation') when matching the particular democratic elements. The study then analyzed the reformers' ideas in terms of the three conceptions of democracy. Specific text elements were included in the analysis to validate (insure trustworthiness of) the conclusions drawn from the analysis.[11]

---

[11]To review the comprehensive analysis and the report of its findings, see Dixon (1997).

Elements of Community Democratic Education--Glickman, Levin, and Sizer[12]

How do the three school reformers' ideas analyzed here reflect particular elements of democracy. For example, what is their view of human nature? Do they believe all in the school community can participate? If so, in what ways? Can or should information be accessed and disseminated to ensure all are informed? What are these reformers' views on the nature of problems and knowledge in making the best educational decisions? A content analysis of the most recent books of Glickman (1998), Levin (Hopfenberg et al., 1993)[13], and Sizer (1996) in a previous study (Dixon, 1997) provided tentative answers to these questions among others. These texts reflect different focuses of their authors: Sizer (Horace's Hope) compared CES with non-CES schools and included a section on reform policy; Glickman's text (Revolutionizing America's Schools) focused on major themes that help to define what democracy means and described what he believes democratic schools should do and look like. He also analyzed race, gender, and other issues related to fairness, equality, fraternity, and liberty. Levin's work (The Accelerated Schools Resource Guide) was written to aid schools in developing a philosophy, process, and structure to implement the Accelerated Schools concept at their site. All made explicit the link between democracy and their reform ideas (Glickman, 1998, pp. 1, 4, 36; Levin, in Hopfenberg et al., 1993, pp. 33, 87; Sizer, 1996, pp. 74, 75, 145). This section highlights the ideas of the three reformers embedded in eight elements of democracy, beginning with their views on government.

---

[12]The content analysis in this section was conducted on three books: Revolutionizing America's Schools (Glickman, 1998), The Accelerated Schools Resource Guide (Levin, [Hopfenberg et al., 1993]), and Horace's Hope (Sizer, 1996). See Dixon (1997) for methodological concerns.

[13]Dr. Henry Levin is the principal architect of the Accelerated Schools Project and the second author of The Accelerated Schools Resource Guide analyzed in this study. Thus, the ideas, though reflecting other authors, will be referred to here as principally Levin's.

Views on Government.[14] Sizer, Glickman, and Levin, all alluded to government activity in educational reform many times throughout their books, though it was not emphasized in Levin's (Levin, in Hopfenberg et al., p. 272). The following is a summary of their ideas followed by examples from their texts. The reformers emphasized community democratic beliefs about government (i.e., a general orientation that would reduce and shift the role of government and circumscribe its power in education policy while increasing the responsibilities of local collective decision making, especially those of teachers and parents who have an immediate interest in particular local schools). It is important to keep in mind that what differentiates liberal and community democratic conceptions is the relationship among the constellation of elements (belief about human nature, role of government, mode of participation, etc.) not merely agreement on one element such as beliefs about the role of government. Government, according to these reformers, should provide support (e.g., resources—monies, information) for the decisions of local schools, not dictate those decisions. 'Community' democratic reformers believe that government should not play a large role in school decision making because they maintain that individuals, locally situated, have a greater capacity to participate, and will benefit by doing so, unlike the liberal democratic conceptualists, who have argued that only an elite can or should participate.

Specifically, Sizer, Glickman, and/or Levin argued that government is out of touch with school conditions and realities; too distant; unresponsive to or not solicitous of school personnel's ideas on needed reform; unrepresentative of a particular student population (the 'needy'); or beholden to special interests (advocates of students with disabilities or school personnel lobbies). For example, Levin wrote "Instead of simply complying with 'downtown' decisions made without staff

---

[14]The term government is defined here to include primarily elected officials, judges, or high level appointed policy makers. The author recognizes that teachers might be defined as government officials, but their employment is not secured through elections nor are they directly accountable to the electorate, an important distinction in the original study defining different conceptions of democracy.

input, accelerated school communities systematically define their own challenges and search out unique solutions that will work for them" (pp. 17-18). Sizer demonstrated through his ideas that current priorities, efficiency or maximizing government control over schools, against values such as effective schooling defined by local school communities is problematic; government is not accountable nor responsive to what he considered to be the 'most relevant' school constituencies—families and school professionals in local schools; government reforms are not significant enough to ameliorate school problems; government heavy-handedness has resulted in consensual illegal and duplicitous activity by school personnel, which, in turn, has led to less effective school practices; government actions and policies should be more strictly circumscribed over education decisions. The following quotes from the reformers' texts reflect some of these beliefs.

> The fact remains that those most involved in the debate over public education appear to agree that the local and state board of education and the administrators who work for them, long entrusted with accountability, do not serve that function well.... A wise resolution will require a new balance of authority between families and government, with a significant tilt toward the former, and a respectful acknowledgment and accommodation of the diversity within our society. (Sizer, 1996, p. 38)

> [Views on the changes in types of schools in the future and choice] reflect the prevalent view that centralized government is an inept and inappropriate tool to set and shape the substance and standards of school policy and practice. They reflect the view that disproportional authority for these purposes should be given to the families affected and the professionals to whom those families entrust their children. Centralized government is needed as financier...as documenter, persuader, supporter, advocate for neglected children, truth-teller, but not, except at the extremes, a director. (Sizer, 1996, p. 141)

> Outside control over curricula disempowers schools and rules out considerations of what topics should be taught at what level, how they should be related to other topics, and to what degree of depth they should be taught.... [I]f democracy 'of the people' were taken earnestly, we would let individual schools decide within broad district, state, and national criteria. (Glickman, 1998, p. 44)

> School boards will need to shift their role to be more like educational Supreme Courts, deciding upon cases where democratic rights, responsibilities, and processes might have been violated. School districts and teachers' unions will need to provide services upon request to those schools already prepared to initiate democratic education, provide facilitation to those schools needing assistance to begin, and provide structure and regulations to those schools unaware or resistant to change. All efforts—judicial, facilitative, and directive—will need to aim at shifting the responsibility for the local, internal operations of schools from the district and state to individual schools, to the local educators, students, parents, and community members. *The role and voice of parents, more than any other group, should become the*

center of policies that will make democracy the serious business of schools. (Glickman, 1998, p. 65, italics added)[15]

Sizer's statements, more so than Glickman's or Levin's, reflected an attachment to the values of individual liberty and rights, 'free' markets and competition, and meeting the diversity of 'community' needs. He claimed though that governments' reach for efficiency through economy of scale reduced individual rights. Government action and sphere of control must be circumscribed to allow greater local school community control. Moreover, Sizer suggested that individual pursuit in a competitive market produced better results in schooling than government leaders consulting experts. The following quote reflected several of these ideas.

> [On the useful reforms to promote in American schools, contemporary] ideas reflect the belief that the market—involving competition and real choice among schools—is a better, if not complete or perfect, regulator of schooling than the traditional educational and political authorities and their experts allies in the teaching profession. [Like citizens in recent health care debate, parents say,] I wish to pick my children's school rather than have the state do the choosing. [Values such as meeting diverse community needs are] ill served by centralized control, which usually demands standardization. (Sizer, 1996, p. 142)

Glickman (1998) also proposed that local schools should be permitted time for planning and the flexibility to reorganize school schedules and working relationships (pp. 51-52); that school choice instead of government direction should guide student attendance decisions, within "equitable racial and socioeconomic balance" parameters (p. 67).

Sizer, Glickman, and Levin insisted that government was or could be helpful in some respects. For example, the courts should protect employee rights in unjust termination. The school board's function, according to Glickman, might be shifted to provide individual rights protection to school communities (p. 65). Moreover, Sizer demonstrated that a school board more favorable to CES reforms may be elected, though only after a good deal of effort is exerted and following some delay. Government, combined with private investment, can also provide valuable resources in curriculum, assessment, and standards-based reform (pp. 46-47). Sizer also noted that

---

[15]There is some confusion in Glickman's writings about the power parents and teachers should wield in the decision making process (see, for example, his discussion of the weight given to the two groups in his writings, 1993, pp. 35,135; 1998, p. 65).

government has played an important oversight role within our system (p. 144). And Levin (in Hopfenberg et al., 1993) wrote that "Once the district office staff become part of the accelerated schools transformation" they enhanced the process, and could "endeavor to protect the risk taking in accelerated schools" (p. 273). Yet, the statements of the three reformers overwhelmingly suggested that government should not be involved deeply in educational policy, but that local school communities should have greater influence. Glickman (1998) emphatically stated that parents' voices should have primary authority over school direction (pp. 67-68), and Sizer (1996) maintained that principals and the school staff should have the greatest control (p. 159). Moreover, Glickman suggested that democratic educational decisions are those made by individuals directly and immediately affected by what goes on in schools.

Nature of Individuals and of the Masses. All three reformers believe strongly that individuals are shaped by their environment, and that everyone would benefit from greater opportunities to participate in decision making and school activities. Sizer noted that CES reforms can positively impact students, *en masse*, intellectually, morally, and socially. For example, when students are called upon to think "deeply" about topics (p. 86), required to take more responsibility for their learning—meaning they must be actively engaged, not passive, in learning—and required to publicly exhibit their understanding (p. 88), then they will learn the "habit" of using critical and creative thinking to "form reasoned judgments" (p. 88). CES schools also required similar traits from those who teach and supervise teachers in those schools. The effect, according to Sizer, was to produce a community of thinkers, who are motivated, interested, cooperative, and caring, and who can reach better decisions.[16] Sizer listed many of the accomplishments of CES schools (from Harlem, to San Diego, to Conyers, Georgia), which have produced student achievement—on

---

[16]Sizer (1996) also noted that in several CES schools there was some difficulty achieving positive results, either with students, the faculty, parents, or administration (pp. 59, 64, 79, 80-81, 136). Thus, Sizer was not as sanguine about human nature based on creating environmental conditions as was Glickman or Levin.

conventional and unconventional measures—significantly above what those schools produced previous to the CES reforms (pp. 19, 32, 54, 59, 79).

Levin and Glickman were more optimistic than Sizer about the prospects for improving individuals capacity to learn and govern themselves wisely through restructuring the school experience. Levin (in Hopfenberg et al., 1993) wrote, "Perceiving at-riskness as a human trait suggests that children are defective or in need of repair or remediation. But children are not the problem, at-riskness has to do with the situation in which we place children" (p. 9). He lamented the specialized and isolated work communities in schools (p. 22) and criticized that "parents feel left out and don't know how they can change things" (p. 13). Levin stated that ASP eliminated ability grouping, built school experiences around children's strengths, and held high expectations for all. These ASP practices, among others, contributed to "dramatic student achievement gains," declines in vandalism and expulsions, and led to increased parent participation at PTA meetings (pp. 18-19, 44).

Glickman (1998) pointed to empirical evidence that democratic school practices promoted "astonishing success in the intellectual achievement of all students" and helped individuals lead satisfying lives (p. 4). Moreover, he cited cognitive research that supports the claim that students who learn through democratic pedagogy "outdistance their peers in learning content, mastering basic skills, [and] achieving understanding and applications" (pp. 25, 29). Democratic education, to Glickman, is partly, enlarging the circle of decision making participation, acknowledging that everyone has valid and helpful resources to contribute, and valuing collaborative and cooperative work structures. Democratic education also encompasses "free expression [and] abundant dissemination of knowledge" (pp. 22-23). Glickman's reforms also reflect the importance of highlighting common interest over self interest (p. 5). The following quotes are examples of the types of statements the reformers made about individuals or the masses.

> I have seen an explosion of energy in parents and local citizens in support of a new district high school in which they will have a respected role and which is designed with their particular children, rather than some stereotype of a child of a certain age (hatched in a remote office building), in mind. A sense of community responsibility is latent in many American

neighborhoods, I have found, even those that are racked by poverty and crime or awash in entitlements of affluence. (Sizer, 1996, p. 138)

In my own experience, I know of perceived 'slow' children who became incredibly intelligent, successful people. But they never would have excelled unless the adults around them had refused to accept the label given to them. Instead these adults treated them as having as much promise as anyone else. (Glickman, 1998, p. 48)

Accelerated schools have high expectations for all children...have a vision and clear goals for making all children academically able...create powerful learning experiences to accelerate the progress of all children. (Levin, in Hopfenberg et al., 1993, p. 17)

Mode of Participation, Nature of Problems and Knowledge, and Information Access and Dissemination. These three elements of democracy are tightly linked to one another in the writing of the reformers, and it serves our purposes here only to demonstrate that linkage and note the community democratic nature of the three elements. All three reformers emphasized the important place that individual participation held in promoting increased personal capacity to govern wisely. But inclusive and widespread participation was necessary also to provide a better understanding of problems confronting society and to mine the minds of those individuals more directly and immediately affected by such problems. Problems, these reformers suggested, were rooted in experience and value orientations. Knowledge relevant to problem-solving was located in specific context—not merely or primarily in 'expertise' derived from outside sources (e.g., academia or government). Problems identified were connected to specific knowledge, which in turn, was perceived as intricately bound to values. Information was actively accessed by and disseminated to all in the process to find solutions. The 'school as a whole' could find common solutions.

Levin's ASP or Glickman's LPS processes reflect the linkage between universal participation, nature of problems and knowledge, and information exchange. The ASP process requires that everyone in the school community participates in several phases of decision making: "taking stock, forging a shared vision, setting priorities, and setting up school governance mechanisms" (pp. 56-57). The process also involves an inquiry ("Inquiry Process") to ascertain 'challenge' areas, causes of problems, alternative solutions, and to assess the solution(s) implemented (p. 49).

A quote from The Accelerated Schools Resource Guide illustrates the connections between the ASP process and the community elements of democracy.

> One of the most notable and important changes in Burnett since it began the process of acceleration is the participation of the whole school community in making important decisions that will lead to their common vision. In all areas of the school, teachers, support staff, administrators, students, parents, and the local community are contributing their energies, opinions, and expertise to solve challenges confronting Burnett. [One participant reflected:]...it's the communication that makes everything happen. [The ASP] gave us a way of communicating...gave us a way of bringing all of the ideas of everyone together. (Levin, in Hopfenberg et al., 1993, p. 44).

Glickman and Sizer also advocated the need to increase participation in school decision making among those in the local community and to involve students more actively in their own learning. Sizer (1996) discussed the complexity of problems and knowledge, whether related to the fast pace change of American culture (p. 29), the complex and interconnected "high school mechanism" (p. 82), adolescents (p. 120), or value disagreements among Americans (pp. 110-111). Such problems required an engaged citizenry that would apply its knowledge to the problems identified (p. 141). It also required, according to Sizer and Glickman, that citizens seek out and distribute information more readily (Sizer, 1996, pp. 120, 125, 144; Glickman, 1998, pp. 9, 29-30, 34). Sizer addressed the nexus between widespread participation, problems and knowledge, information exchange, and values in an effort necessary to reform schools.

> A better system could, for example, grow out of the alliance of individual schools—the students, teachers, parents, and neighbors—that share specific educational objectives, with these schools collaboratively designing and shaping what they collectively need at the top. That is, the initiative would come from the ranks rather than from the high-level planners. (Sizer, 1996, p. 69)

Reforms in classrooms would require students to participate more actively and responsibly too. Students, for example, should be required to act as mentors, to meet and brief visitors, or to produce a product for general consumption (e.g., media event) (Sizer, 1996, p. 20). Because societal problems are complex, traditional subject-centered studies are no longer appropriate. Therefore, students should be expected to engage in interdisciplinary problem solving (Sizer, 1996, p. 53).

Glickman (1998) emphasized that students should also learn by actively engaging problems in the community and by locating resources outside the school. Furthermore, he suggested that rather than using mimeographed sheets, workbooks, or textbooks, students should have access to "computers, telephones, literature, and reference materials" (pp. 37-38). Glickman proposed that "[democracy as a] powerful theory of education [included] the need for learners to actively participate in diffusing and constructing knowledge" (p. 9). To accomplish school wide reforms and democratic decision making, a "critical study process" (i.e., "action research") would provide a continual flow of relevant and local information to assess practices (p. 55). Thus, democratic education entailed greater participation among students in classrooms and in the school community at-large, and widespread participation across these schools, which shaped how problems were defined, what knowledge was relevant, and an open exchange of information.

Expanse of Governance. Sizer also emphasized the role that small schools (population of schools or classrooms) plays in the democratic education reforms he advocated. Glickman agreed to a large extent, while Levin gave the topic scant attention. Schools, according to Sizer (1996), must be "human-scale places" (p. 91). Small-sized schools offered the best opportunity to realize democracy—creating caring and nurturing places and highly participatory communities in education decisionmaking, tackling problems collaboratively, sharing information among relevant constituencies, and producing students who can all excel in a variety of ways. Thus, small schools emphasized certain values, particularly community democratic values, over others. Sizer also distinguished between small size related to teacher-student relationships and responsibilities, and size connected to overall school populations; both promoted the best conditions for democratic learning. The statements included below reflect the importance and meaning Sizer attached to this element of democratic education.

> The faculty is small enough to find within itself a sense of community. That faculty and the principal have extraordinary freedom to shape their school in ways that they and their community want, rather than march to a standardized system developed elsewhere. This allows them, as a result, to narrow their work to essentials, to run a school so simple in its construction that it can bend to the needs of particular children. (Sizer, 1996, pp. 23-24)

> Bigness all too readily signals a need for order—crowd control, some call it—and order all too usually implies standardized routines and a rule driven, impersonal school culture. [Young adolescents] need much more than this, however, including sensitivity of a particular sort—sensitivity that recognizes and respects the extraordinary physical and emotional changes that most of them are experiencing. (Sizer, 1996, p. 31)

Importantly too, Sizer and Glickman praised small-sized schools and teacher-student ratios because they permit the establishment of personalized relationships and trust (Sizer, 1996, pp. 91-92; Glickman, 1998, p. 163). Moreover, Sizer implied that "small schools promoted higher achievement among students" (p. 94). And Glickman professed that small schools enabled the faculty "to sit together around the same table and make plans for and with their students" (p. 40); to plan opportunities for "team teaching;" to construct an interdisciplinary curriculum; and to develop "standards and reports of student performance" (p. 41). Glickman did caution, however, that small schools (together with school autonomy) did not automatically lead to "change or improved education," merely that it established the conditions "conducive to change" (p. 41). Levin noted that small schools "permit the individual attention that each student needs" (p. 12) and promote student connectedness "to the school family" (p. 41). He also asserted that a school with too many students may raise faculty concerns about discipline problems (p. 220) and negate effective communication in classroom activities as happened in an ASP school (p. 309).

Value Priorities. Overall, the works of the three reformers reflected that they cherished community democratic values, though Sizer's work reflected more a mixture of community and liberal democratic values. For example, Glickman and Levin, especially, stressed the values of widespread local school cooperation and collaboration in problem identification and solution, development of shared history and vision, the need to nurture others and school community, dilution of status constraints, open dialogue, and local collective responsibility. Sizer also promoted many of these same values, with particular emphasis on 'human scale' places that permits personalization of in-school relationships. A few examples from their texts demonstrate several of these priorities.

Instead of simply complying with 'downtown' decisions made without staff input, accelerated school communities systematically define their own challenges and search out unique solutions that will work for them. (Levin, in Hopfenberg et al., 1993, pp. 17-18)

[On implementing an ASP classroom exercise:] Establish an environment in your classroom in which multiple strengths and abilities [of students] are truly valued. (Levin, in Hopfenberg et al, 1993, p. 31)

['In accordance with accelerated school values:'] The entire school community collaboratively works toward a shared purpose by meeting with, talking with, and learning from each others' experiences. (Levin, in Hopfenberg et al., 1993, p. 32)

[In an interview with a principal implementing small school practices:] There can be an identification based on community that will not happen in a huge impersonal institution (where people are known by roles and status), not Paul, Carl and Christine.... (Glickman, 1998, p. 163)

It is not only that each teacher must have a sensible load of students. It is that the school itself has to be of human scale—a place where everyone can know everyone else.... More than one teacher must know the child (and her family) well.... So much of importance in schools depends on trust, and trust arises from familiarity.... (Sizer, 1996, pp. 91-92)

Importantly, both Sizer and Glickman recognized the significance of some liberal democratic priorities such as competition, individualism, order and stability, or cost efficiency (see for example, Sizer, 1996, pp. 6, 15-16, 26, 30, 47, 115; Glickman, 1998, pp. 69, 90-92, 101, 132, 138). Too, some values that these reformers promoted did not fit within the conceptual scheme offered here (e.g., localism and nationalism) (Sizer, 1996, p. 43). But these democratic educational leaders' ideas fit most neatly within the community democratic conception. Now, we turn to the potential problems posed for consumers of these community democratic reforms due to the pervasive nature of liberal and participatory democratic conceptions.

Implications for Consumers of Community Democratic Education Reforms

The democratic school reformers' ideas analyzed in this study described elements of democracy that coincided most nearly with the community conception (see Table 3). In general, all three reformers suggested that individuals and the masses can and should participate in all stages of school decision making and that all would grow intellectually, morally, and socially when doing so. They deemphasized the role of government, criticizing it for its shortcomings, and advising that its role should be greatly curtailed in school decision making. They advocated identifying

problems and solutions through the collective participation and knowledge of all members of the local school immediately affected by school decisions (but particularly parents, school staff, and students), and pursuing information from numerous sources in doing so. These reformers believed that local communities, when cooperatively working to solve problems, could identify common interests, reach consensus on goals and solutions, and implement those solutions. At least two of the reformers (Sizer and Glickman) explicitly and repeatedly identified small-sized schools as providing the best conditions for educating children and school decision making.

In contrast, the elements identified in other conceptions of democracy, particularly the liberal conception, belie many of the assumptions of the community democratic paradigm. The liberal and participatory conceptions and their assumptions are critical to understanding the complex system of governance that mediates school decision making because their elements are present in communities, and they undergird the formal system of governance. These assumptions also appear to have implications for how school decision making may operate in schools that oppose those of the reformers' studied here. The differences between the community and other democratic conceptions are explored below.

Unlike the ideas of the school reform advocates analyzed here, the liberal conception suggests that establishing small schools (i.e., low teacher-student ratios within classes or schools within a school—"pods") may not result in the cultivation of a caring and nurturing community. Theorists such as Madison argued instead that larger spheres of rule were preferred to small spheres because they would more adequately protect heterogeneous views and values from tyranny. Furthermore, these theorists argued that selecting leaders from a wider sphere promoted the rise of more disinterested and virtuous individuals, especially those not connected to factious local interests. While the reformers discussed here also touted the connection between small size of decision making units in schools and flexibility of decision making, the liberal conception suggests that individuals, in general, prefer stability to change; order, to experimentation.

Liberal and participatory conceptualists also argue, respectively, that government is necessary to protect property resulting from the unequal abilities of individuals and to protect individuals from undesirable, yet inherent, characteristics of humanity or to provide a commonly agreed upon (Constitutional), and thus legally recognized, forum to mediate conflict among individuals. Both conceptions view government as a necessary enforcement mechanism as well. Furthermore, political parties, vying for government power, help to channel disagreements, ensure opportunities for dissent, and provide a mechanism for governing once in power.

On the other hand, the three reformers analyzed here suggested a far more limited role for government over school decision making, including less of a role in lawmaking and conflict mediation (except in civil rights protections). These reformers indicated that small 'associations' (e.g., local school communities) can perform decision making and conflict mediation within a broader legal framework. Such a system is based on their belief in the potential for all individuals to arrive at common goals and interests when those affected most immediately by decisions are actively and collaboratively involved in making, implementing, and evaluating those decisions.

Liberal or participatory democratic conceptions also provide alternative avenues for public participation from those emphasized by reformers analyzed here. The liberal conception limits general public participation to voting in elections periodically and discussion around ideas provided by elites due to unequal knowledge and/or undesirable characteristics of individuals and/or the masses, in general. Periodic elections provide an important, but necessarily limited, measure of responsiveness and accountability to the public. Limited levels of general participation enhance the opportunity for the elite to make well-studied and thoughtful decisions, based on substantial experiential or contextual knowledge. Limited participation, these theorists claim, also promotes the values of stability and order.

In the participatory conception, greater participation in decision making is more desirable than in the liberal conception, though elections are still the focus of widespread decisions. Through elections, a degree of responsiveness and accountability is maintained, values are prioritized, and

victories recorded, and thus, agreed to by all, under the threat of sanction, until the following election. Government, as mentioned previously, is necessary to enforce such agreements.

Elements of community democracy, in contrast, do not have similar accountability or responsiveness mechanisms. Elections may occur on particular issues broached by internal governance committees, but these elections do not decide who attains (or loses) power to implement values, since all are assumed to be willing to implement decisions voted upon. (Presumably, the common good wins.) Election decisions, too, are decided by large majorities (and/or unanimously), so that widespread consensus will ensure greater potential for actual implementation and success. Furthermore, in the community democratic conception advocated by these reformers, decision implementation and evaluation are ensured, not through threat of punitive measures, nor through decisions reached in government recognized elections, but through widespread involvement in decision making at all stages of the process, including agenda setting and deliberation, and through reaching consensus on common goals and on the common good. Resort to such inclusive participation is thought to promote values such as shared understanding, open dialogue, collaboration and cooperation to solve problems, and dilution of status constraints, not competition, individualism, or unresolvable differences.

The reformers analyzed here appear to agree that local communities are the best source to solve educational problems (though Sizer emphasized the importance educational research should play). Like the community conception of democracy, these reformers believe that problems are rooted in local circumstance and experience, particularly context specific knowledge and value priorities, and thus, their solutions must rely on the knowledge of those closest to the problems, local school parents, teachers and staff, students, and to a lesser extent, the wider community constituency. Technical knowledge (e.g., scientific method or quantitative or qualitative research methodology) is helpful, but the local community must drive the process and evaluate the alternative solutions in terms of their own understanding, experience, and value priorities. Elites

'external' to local schools may be called upon to provide support (e.g., consultants) or information (e.g., aggregate school achievement data), but not to dictate solutions.

Participatory conceptualists agree in part with community conceptualists on problems and knowledge, but appear to give greater weight to irreconcilable differences among individuals or groups about what constitutes valid knowledge or problems, or the common good. The nature of problems and knowledge is complicated by the fact that the former stems principally from an individual's circumstance (e.g., Sara Lee layoff boosted stocks but cost jobs) and what knowledge is believed to be valid is contested due to contrasting value preferences, experiences, and self-interest. Thus, government is a necessary arbiter of school decisions because both problems and knowledge are contested. Participation is principally related to collaborating with other like-minded or situated individuals to effect change through elections. Conflict is seen as natural. Competitive and cooperative values are both seen as necessary and important.

The liberal democratic conception deems problems and knowledge as complex too. But due to unequal inherent talent, some individuals are seen as more knowledgeable and capable of solving problems. Also based on the attributes of modern industrial society and division of labor, individuals become specialists, and thus, subject-specific experts are thought to make better decisions. An ideology of value neutrality and technical rationality is assumed in problem solving. Information is not widely distributed or is clothed in technical language, and thus, not easily accessible. Political elites and issue specialists join forces to offer the public a limited menu of problems and solutions, often veiled in symbolism. Once elected, these elites collaborate to devise and implement solutions and evaluate outcomes.

The prevalence of contrasting conceptions of democracy in, over, and around schools provides a challenging environment in which to enact school reforms, either internal or external to the school. The three conceptions of democracy elaborated in this study may aid the consumers of democratic school reform in navigating potential obstacles. The ideas of the three reformers analyzed in this study provide a roadmap to achieve democratic reforms in line with the

community conception. But followers of these reforms should keep in mind some of the contradictions implied in a wider system of governance that also includes significant elements of the liberal and participatory conceptions. The questions below may deserve further attention to discern whether schools can accomplish the reforms Sizer, Glickman, and Levin suggested in the complex democratic environment in which schools exist.

1. Do small-sized school practices (e.g., low teacher-student ratios or small schools in general) with heterogenous school populations produce an environment of tolerance, shared understanding, unity of general will (common vision), or nurturing others and community?

2. Does an in-school decision making mechanism with elections with little consequence for authority (i.e., legal power), for those in power, lead to responsiveness and accountability to community-wide constituents, to unified actions, or to collective implementation?

3. Is accountability and responsibility possible in a school with a plural executive?

4. Is knowledgeable and widespread participation across a school community on school-wide issues possible?

5. Are community values (see Table 3), singly or in combination, prioritized above individualism, competition, private property, or privacy?

6. Do extra legal election decision mechanisms (e.g., "School as Whole") promote greater levels of information access or distribution than government elections?

7. Can strong and/or capable leadership coincide with mass participation that includes one person, one vote, but no opposition political party organization?

8. Does widespread participation in school decision making produce system stability? If not, which is more highly valued?

9. Does widespread participation produce intolerance for minority concerns?

10. Does widespread action lead to unthinking conformity?

11. Does public debate or forums lead to common understanding, collaboration, cooperation, and/or increased levels of information access and distribution?

References

Adler, S.A., Luhn, C.A., & Philbin, P.J. (1993). Participatory citizenship: Made and remade for each generation. International Journal of Social Education, 8(1), 67-74.

Allen, L. (in press). Restructuring and renewal: Capturing the power of democracy. In A. Hargreaves, A Liberman, M. Fullan & D. Hopkins (Eds.) International handbook of educational change. Cluwer Academic Publishers.

Allen, L.R. (1993). The role of voice in shared governance: A case study of a primary school. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Georgia, Athens.

Allen, L., & Glickman, C.D. (1992). School improvement: The elusive faces of shared governance. NASSP Bulletin, 76 (542), 80-87.

Apple, M.W., & Beane, J.A. (Eds.) (1995). Democratic schools. Alexandria, VA: Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development.

Appleton, S. (1995). Teaching American democracy through historical cases. PS: Political Science & Politics 28 (4), 730-733.

Arendt, H. (1963). On revolution. London: Penguin Books.

Ball, S.J. (1987). The micro-politics of the school: Towards a theory of school organization. London: Methuen & Co.

Barber, B.R. (1988). Political participation and the creation of res publica. In A. Ritterk, & J. Bondanella (Eds.), Rousseau's political writings: Discourse on inequality, discourse on political economy, and on social contract (pp. 292-306). New York: W.W. Norton & Company.

Barber, B.R. (1992). An aristocracy of everyone: The politics of education and the future of America. New York: Ballentine Books.

Beard, C. (1913). An economic interpretation of the constitution of the United States. New York: Macmillan.

Blumenfeld, P.C., Marx, R.W., Soloway, E., & Krajcik, J. (1996). Learning with peers: From small group cooperation to collaborative communities. Educational Researcher 25(8), 37-40.

Bogdan, R.C., & Biklen, S.K. (1992). Qualitative research for education: An introduction to theory and methods. Boston: Allyn and Bacon.

Bryant-Booker, D. (1995). Shared governance conditions in some league of professional schools which lead to improved student outcomes (decision making). Dissertation Abstracts International, 56 (01), 12A. (University Microfilms No. AAI96-10039).

Budd, R.W., Thorp, R.K., & Donohew, L. (1967). Content analysis of communications. NY: The Macmillan Company.

Burke, J.P. (1989). Reconciling public administration and democracy: The role of the responsible administrator. Public Administration Review,49(2), 467-472.

Carr, W., & Hartnett, A. (1996). Education and the struggle for democracy: The politics of educational ideas. Philadelphia: Open University Press.

Christensen, G.J. (1993). The changing role of the principal in the move from a traditional school to an accelerated school. Stanford University, CA: Center for Educational Research. (ERIC Document No. 375 501)

Cook, B.J. (1992). Subordination or independence for administrators? The decision of 1789 reexamined. Public Administration Review, 52 (5), pp. 497-503.

Carnoy, M. (1976). Educational reform and social control in the United States, 1830-1970. In M. Carnoy & H.M. Levin (Eds.), The limits of educational reform (pp. 115-155). New York: David McKay Company, Inc.

Cremin, L.A. (1961). The transformation of the school: Progressivism in American education 1876-1957. New York: Random House.

Crocker, L.G. (Ed.). (1967). Jean-Jacques Rousseau: The social contract and discourse on the origin of inequality. New York: Simon & Schuster, Inc.

Dahl, R.A. (1956). A preface to democratic theory. Chicago: University of Chicago.

Dahl, R.A. (1989). Democracy and its critics. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Davidson, B.M. (1992, April). Transforming schools: Foundations for school restructuring focusing on the role of the teacher in four elementary schools. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development, New Orleans, LA.

Davidson, B.M., & Dell, G.L. (1995, January). Discovering the meaning of unity of purpose: A case study of fourteen accelerated schools. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Southwest Educational Research Association, Dallas, TX.

Dewey, J. (1916). Democracy and education: An introduction to the philosophy of education. New York: The Free Press.

Dixon, D.A. (1998). Lessons for 'Community' Democratic School Reformers from Publius and Friends. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Educational Research Association, San Diego, CA.

Dixon, D.A. (1997, February 4). Another view on taxing for local schools. The Red & Black, p. 4.

Dixon, D.A. (1996). Teaching democracy as a 'practical' science: Reorganizing the curriculum at institutions of higher education for active citizenship. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Educational Research Association, New York.

Dougherty, G.W. (1995). Principals' perspectives of their role when implementing shared governance (decision making). Unpublished dissertation, University of Georgia, Athens.

Downs, A. (1957). An economic theory of democracy. New York: Harper & Row.

Education Commission of the States. (1995). Extending the reach of reform. State Education Leader, 13 (3). Denver, CO: Author.

Dryzek, J.S. (1996). Political inclusion and the dynamics of democratization. American Political Science Review, 90(1), 475-487.

Engle, S.H. (1989). Whatever happened to the social studies? International Journal of Social Education, 4(1), 42-51.

Evans, K.M. (1992). Trust and shared governance of schools: A qualitative approach. Dissertation Abstracts International, 53, 09A. (University Microfilms No. AAI9234218).

Feldman, D. (1993). Introduction: Public administration and the constitution. Public Administration Review, 53 (3), 237-239.

Fenstermacher, G.D. (1997). On restoring public and private life. In J.I. Goodlad & T.J. McMannon (Eds.), The public purposes of education and schooling (pp. 55-71). San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Ferrara, M.M., & Knight, S.L. (1993, April). Change and challenge: A longitudinal study of an accelerated school parent involvement cadre. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Educational Research Association, Atlanta, GA.

Finer, H. (1941). Administrative responsibility in democratic government. Public Administration Review, 1(4), 335-350.

Finnan, C., St. John, E.P., McCarthy, J., & Slovacek, S.P. (1996). Accelerated schools in action: Lessons from the field. Thousand Oaks, CA: Corwin Press.

Finnan, C.R., & Hopfenberg, W.S. Becoming a true middle school: Cultural transformation of accelerated middle schools. Stanford, CA: Accelerated Schools. (ERIC Document No. 374 548)

Frederickson, H.G. (1971). Toward a new public administration. In F. Marini (Ed.), Toward a new public administration: The minnowbrook perspective, (pp. 309-331). Scranton, PA: Chandler.

Freire, P. (1993). Pedagogy of the oppressed (Rev. ed.). New York: Continuum.

Glickman, C.D. (1990). Pushing school reform to a new edge: The seven ironies of school empowerment. Phi Delta Kappan, 72 (1), 68-75.

Glickman, C.D. (1991). Pretending not to know what we know. Educational Leadership, 48 (8), 4-10.

Glickman, C.D. (1992). The essence of school renewal: The prose has begun. Educational Leadership, 50 (1), 24-27.

Glickman, C.D. (1993). Renewing America's schools: A guide for school-based action. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.

Glickman, C.D. (1998). Revolutionizing America's Schools. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Glickman, C.D., Allen, L.R., & Lunsford, B.F. (1994). Voices of principals from democratically transformed schools. In J. Murphy & K. Seashore Lewis (Eds.), Reshaping the

principalship: Insights from transformational reform efforts (pp. 203-218). Thousand Oaks, CA: Corwin Press, Inc.

Goodlad, J.I. (1984). A place called school: Promise for the future. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Grant, S.G. (1996). Locating authority over content and pedagogy: Cross-current influences on teachers' thinking and practice. Theory and Research in Social Education, 24(3), 237-272.

Gutmann, A. (1987). Democratic education. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Hayek, F.A. (1944). The road to serfdom. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Hayek, F.A. (1960). The constitution of liberty (pp. 85-102). Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Heffner, R.D. (Ed.). (1984). Alexis de Tocqueville: Democracy in America. New York: New American Library, Inc.

Held, D. (1987). Models of democracy. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Hepburn, M.A. (1983). Democratic education in schools and classrooms. Washington, D.C.: National Council for the Social Studies.

Hofstadter, R. (1963). Anti-intellectualism in American life (pp. 299-390). New York: Alfred A. Knoff.

hooks, b. (1994). Teaching to transgress: Education as the practice of freedom. New York: Routledge.

Hopfenberg, W.S., Levin, H.M., Chase, C., Christensen, S.G., Moore, M., Soler, P., Brunner, I., Keller, B., & Rodriguez, G. (1993). The accelerated schools resource guide. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Hunt, M.P., & Metcalf, L.E. (1955). Teaching high school social studies: Problems in reflective thinking and social understanding. New York: Harper & Brothers.

Hyland, J.L. (1995). Democratic theory: The philosophical foundations. New York: Manchester University Press.

Isaak, A.C. (1985). Scope and methods of political science: An introduction to the methodology of political inquiry. Homewood, IL: The Dorsey Press.

Jennings, R.E. (1981). School advisory councils in America: Frustration and failure. In G. Baron (Ed.), The politics of school government (pp. 23-51). New York: Pergamon Press.

Kelly, A.V. (1995). Education and democracy: Principles and practices. London: Paul Chapman Publishing.

Kerr, D.H. (1996). Democracy, nurturance, and community. In R. Soder (Ed.), Democracy, education, and the schools (pp. 37-68). San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Kozol, J. (1991). Savage inequalities: Children in America's schools. New York: Crown Publishers, Inc.

Krippendorff, K. (1980). Content analysis: An introduction to its methodology. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.

Kuhn, T.S. (1970). The structure of scientific revolutions. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Labaree, B.W. (1966). The Boston tea party. New York: Oxford University Press.

Larkins, M.G., & McKinney C.W. (1980). Four types of theory: Implications for research in social education. Theory and Research in Social Education, 8(1), 9-17.

Laslett, P. (Ed.). (1960). John Locke: Two treatises of government. New York: The New American Library.

Levin, H.M. (1976). Educational reform: Its meaning. In M. Cornoy & H.M. Levin (Eds.), The limits of educational reform (pp. 23-51). New York: David McKay Company, Inc.

Levin, H.M. (1996). Accelerated schools: The background. In C. Finnan, E.P. St. John, J. McCarthy, & S.P. Slovacek (Eds.), Accelerated Schools in Action: Lessons from the Field (pp. 3-23). Thousand Oaks, CA: Corwin Press, Inc.

Lippmann, W. (1925). The phantom public. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company.

Lippmann, W. (1922). Public opinion. New York: The Free Press.

Lowi, T.J. (1993). Legitimizing public administration: A disturbed dissent. Public Administration Review, 53 (3), 261-264.

Macpherson, C.B. (1966). The real world of democracy. New York: Oxford University Press.

Manheim, J.B., & Rich, R.C. (1991). Empirical political analysis: Research methods in political science. New York: Longman.

Marchington, M. (1995). Involvement and participation. In J. Storey (Ed.), Human resources management (pp. 280-305). London: Routledge.

Maslow, A. H. (1960). A theory of human motivation. In I.L. Heckmann, Jr. & S.G. Huneryager (Eds.), Human relations in management (pp. 122-144). Cincinnati: South-Western Publishing Company.

Mathews, D. (1994). Politics for people: Finding a responsible public voice. Chicago: University of Illinois Press.

McAninch, S.A. (1989, Spring). A response to John Palmer's paper. International Journal of Social Education, 4(1), 65-67.

Meier, D. (1995). The power of their ideas: Lessons for America from a small school district in Harlem. Boston: Beacon Press.

Merlino, F.J. (1995). The development of democratic reasoning in children. Educational Horizons, 72 (2), 89-96.

Mimms, J. (1996). Principals speak out on their evolving leadership role. In C. Finnan, E.P. St. John, J. McCarthy & S.P. Slovacek (Eds.), Accelerated schools in action: Lessons from the field (pp. 208-218). Thousand Oaks, CA: Corwin Press.

Morgan, E.S., & Morgan, H.M. (1962). The stamp act crisis: Prologue to revolution. Collier Macmillan.

Oliver, D.M., & Shaver, J.P. (1966). Teaching public issues in the high school. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

Paley, V.G. (1995). Kwanzaa and me: A teacher's story. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Palmer, J.R. (1989). Whatever happened to the social studies? International Journal of Social Education, 4(1), 60-64.

Paris, D.C. (1995). Ideology and educational reform: Themes and theories in public education. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Pateman, C. (1970). Participation and democratic theory. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Pressman, J.L., & Wildavsky, A. (1984). Implementation: How great expectations in Washington are dashed in Oakland (3rd ed.). Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Putnam, R.D. (1995). Tuning in, tuning out: The strange disappearance of social capital in America. American Political Science Review, 28(4), 664-683.

Riker, W.A. (1965). Democracy in the United States. New York: Macmillan.

Ritter, A., & Bondanella, J.C. (Eds.). (1988). Rousseau's political writings (pp. 232-260). New York:

Rohr, J.A. (1987). The administrative state and constitutional principle. In R.C. Chandler (Ed.), A centennial history of the American administrative state (pp. 113-159). New York: Macmillan.

Rolheiser, C., & Glickman, C.D. (1995). Teaching for democratic life. The Educational Forum, 59, 196-206

Rosenbloom, D.H., & Carroll, J.D. (1990). Public administration and constitutional competence: An introduction. In D.H. Rosenbloom & J.D. Carroll (Eds.), Toward constitutional competence: A casebook for public administrators (pp. 1-10). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Rossiter, C. (Ed.) (1961). The federalist papers: Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, John Jay. New York: The New American Library.

Sarason, S.B. (1996). Barometers of change: Individual, educational, and social transformation (pp. 239-262). San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Sarason, S.B. (1995). Parental involvement and the political principle: Why the existing governance structure of schools should be abolished. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Sarason, S.B. (1990). The predictable failure of school reform: Can we change course before it's too late? San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Sarason, S.B. (1971). The culture of the school and the problem of change. Boston: Allyn & Bacon.

Saxe, D. (1989). A response to Shirley Engle's paper. International Journal of Social Education, 4(1), 52-54.

Schattschneider, E.E. (1960). The semisovereign people: A realist's view of democracy in America. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.

Schon, D.A. (1987). Educating the reflective practitioner: Toward a new design for teaching and learning in the professions. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Schumpeter, J.A. (1976). Capitalism, socialism, and democracy (5th ed.). Boston: George Allen & Unwin.

Shaver, J.P, & Larkins, A.G. (1973). Decision making in a democracy. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

Shaw, P. (1976). The character of John Adams. New York: W.W. Norton & Company.

Sitkoff, H. (1981). The struggle for black equality: 1954-1980. New York: Hill and Wang.

Sizer, T.R. (1996). Horace's hope: What works for the American high school. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

Sizer, T.R. (1992). Horace's school: Redesigning the American high school. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

Soder, R. (Ed.). (1996). Democracy, education, and the schools. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Spicer, M.W., & Terry, L.D. (1993). Legitimacy, history, and logic: Public administration and the constitution. Public Administration Review, 53(3), 239-245.

Spring, J. (1996). American education. New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc.

Steiner, D.M. (1994). Rethinking democratic education: The politics of reform. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Stivers, C. (1993). Rationality and romanticism in constitutional argument. Public Administration Review, 53(3), 254-257.

Tarcov, N. (1996). The meanings of democracy. In R. Soder (Ed.), Democracy, education, and the schools (pp. 125-150). San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Thoreau, H.D. (1849/1993). Civil Disobedience. In Walden and other writings: Henry David Thoreau (pp. 12-29). New York: Barnes & Noble.

Thoreau, H.D. (1854/1993). Slavery in Massachusetts. In Walden and other writings: Henry David Thoreau (pp. 30-55). New York: Barnes & Noble.

Thoreau, H.D. (1859/1993). A Plea for Captain John Brown. In Walden and other writings: Henry David Thoreau (pp. 72-94). New York: Barnes & Noble.

Tillich, P. (1948). The shaking of the foundations. New York: Charles Scribners' Sons.

Todd, M.B. (1994). Information dissemination and school reform: A case study of an information retrieval system. Unpublished dissertation, University of Georgia, Athens.

Truman, D.B. (1971). The governmental process: Political interests and public opinion. (2nd ed.). New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

Tuchman, G. (1994). Historical social science: Methodologies, methods, and meanings. In N.K. Denzin & Y.S. Lincoln (Eds.), Handbook of qualitative research. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Tyack, D, & Cuban, L. (1995). Tinkering toward utopia: A century of public school reform. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

VanSickle, R.L. (1979). Neutralizing status constraints on student performance in small group activities. Theory and Research in Social Education, 7(2), 1-33.

VanSickle, R.L. (1983). Practicing what we teach: Promoting democratic experiences in the classroom. In M.A. Hepburn (Ed.), Democratic education in schools and classrooms (pp. 49-66). Washington, D.C.: National Council for the Social Studies.

VanSickle, R.L. (1985). Research implications of a theoretical analysis of John Dewey's how we think. Theory and Research in Social Education, 13(3), 1-20.

Weber, R.P. (1985). Basic content analysis. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications.

Westbrook, R.B. (1996). Public schooling and American democracy. In R. Soder (Ed.), Democracy, education, and the schools (pp. 125-150). San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Wilson, W. (1887). The study of public administration. Political Science Quarterly, 2(1), 3-17.

Wood, G.H. (1982). The American dream, democracy, and participatory theory. Georgia Social Science Journal, 14(1), 4-8.

Wood, G.H. (1982). The theoretical and political limitations of deschooling: An essay review of educating the worker-citizen by Joel Spring. Journal of Education, 164(4), 361-377.

Wood, G.H. (1984). Schooling in a democracy: Transformation or reproduction? Educational Theory, 34(3), 219-239.

Wood, G.H. (1988). The hope for civic education. Theory into Practice, 27(4), 296-302.

Wood, G.H. (1989). Whatever happened to the social studies? International Journal of Social Education, 4(1), 55-59.

Wood, G.H. (1992). Schools that work: America's most innovative public education program. New York: Penguin Books.

Wood, G.S. (1969). The creation of the American republic: 1776-1787 (pp. 567-592). New York: W.W. Norton.

Yankelovich, D. (1991). Coming to public judgment: Making democracy work in a complex world. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press.

Zinn, H. (1995). A people's history of the United States: 1492-present. New York: HarperCollins.

Appendix[17]

Table 1

Elements of the Liberal Conception of Democracy

Elements of Conceptions	Research Conclusions	Research Source[18]
Nature of Individuals and Masses	No common will; ignorant and unmotivated to learn outside area of interest or experience; limited capacity to understand real world complexity—proclivity to distort based on personal experience and values; prone to unreflective, passionate action; apathetic; reactive, not proactive; psychological need for authoritarian leaders; need for stability, coherence, and simplicity; incompetence unremediable; unequal; selfish, whimsical	Schumpeter, 1976; Lippmann, 1922, 1925; Berelson, Sartori, and Eckstein, cited in Pateman, 1970; Shaver and Larkins, 1973; Schattschneider, 1960; Downs, 1957; Adams, cited in Shaw, 1976; Madison and Hamilton, cited in Rossiter, 1961; Hayek, 1960; Locke, cited in Laslett, 1960; Plato and Machiavelli, cited in Held, 1987
Views on Government[19]	Negative; limited scope (free markets emphasized); freedom threatening; primary role—protection of Constitutional rights and private property; necessary primarily for community decision making (establish laws) and execution of laws	Hayek, 1944; Locke, cited in Laslett, 1960; Madison, cited in Rossiter, 1961; Montesquieu, cited in Held, 1987

[17]Tables 1 through 3 are taken from Dixon (1997, pp. 79-85).

[18]The researchers listed here do not all subscribe necessarily to all the characteristics listed in any particular element. However, the combination of characteristics is useful to distinguish between different conceptions of democracy and to build a theoretical model for each based on general orientations (e.g., emphasis on nature versus nurture in human development).

[19]The term government was defined in this study to include only elected officials and court judges or justices. While one can argue that the term government might include all state employees (e.g., teachers or others in public schools), the rationale here is that only those officials intricately involved in political elections and or party politics, and who have legal standing to make, or to interpret the constitutionality of law, represent the state in the strictest sense. Elected officials, in turn, are legally accountable and responsive to the general public, at least in theory. Moreover, judges and justices are required to be responsive to laws made by those elected officials, and are accountable for this to continue in office. The author recognizes that this distinction in terminology is somewhat tenuous but legitimate and helpful for the purposes of this analysis.

Information Access and Distribution	Limited due to experiential constraints, complexity, time constraints, potential for misinterpretation, bounded social relationships, protection of self or community interests or of cherished values or beliefs, competition, cultural norms (ideology of privacy)	Lippmann, 1922, 1925; Downs, 1957; Schattschneider, 1960; Schumpeter, 1976
Mode of Participation	Highest level of participation in government decision making (and in competition to rule) limited to political and expert elites; mass participation limited to elections, primarily voting and discussion around ideas proposed by elites; ideology of limited public sphere, organizational complexity, costs of participation, and procedural rules on governing scope lead to elite rule; two party system limits scope of issues considered and influence	Schumpeter, 1976; Berelson, Sartori, and Eckstein, cited in Pateman, 1970; Schattschneider, 1960; Downs, 1957; Madison, cited in Rossiter, 1961; Plato, cited in Held, 1987
Nature of Problems and Knowledge	Problems are complex, thus, decision making limited to experts (specialized knowledge, emphasis on technical rationality, value neutrality); problems rooted in values and citizens disagree on value priorities , thus, decision making limited to elites who compete to promote limited range of value priorities; problems simplified by electoral organization and definition; knowledge is tied to science or disciplinary perspective	Lippmann, 1922, 1925; Schattschneider, 1960; Downs, 1957; Locke, cited in Laslett, 1960; Madison, cited in Rossiter, 1961; Schumpeter, 1976; Wilson, 1887
Size of Territory or Population	Large sphere of rule (combined with elected representation) prevents tyranny; large sphere of rule protects heterogeneous views and values; large sphere promotes election of virtuous, disinterested leaders	Madison, cited in Rossiter, 1961; Dahl, cited in Pateman, 1970
Value Priorities	Freedom from government ("liberty"); limited scope of government; individualism; system stability; order; security; competition; private property; Constitution law tied to freedom from government	References in elements cited previously in Table 1

Table 2

Elements of the Participatory Conception of Democracy

Elements of Conceptions	Research Conclusions	Research Sources
Nature of Individuals and Masses	Shaped by the environment (e.g., economic self sufficiency, opportunities to participate and to be educated, non discriminatory laws), thus, individuals and society can reach increased levels of intellectual, skill, and moral development, become more responsible, more capable and confident to participate, more considerate of the interests of all (recognizing interdependence or common good); environment is shaped by wide-ranging types of institutions ("associations") (e.g., families, churches, schools)	Rousseau and Wollstonecraft, cited in Held, 1987; J.S. Mill and Cole, cited in Pateman, 1970; Pateman, 1970; Gutmann, 1987; Mathews, 1994
Views on Government	Primarily positive; serves to mediate and balance competing demands; provides opportunity for collective decision making, vehicle for more inclusive representation; note: some participatory theorists suggest that 'the state' (including government) is co-opted by various private interests (e.g., capital), and in such cases, government is not, or is only partially, a counterweight to other power centers	Held, 1987; Dahl, Offe, Miliband, McPherson and Pateman, cited in Held, 1987; Truman, 1951; Mathews, 1994
Information Access and Distribution	Citizens with equal effective rights must have wide-ranging access to information, and in turn, rights to disseminate information; competition among multiple factions is more conducive to free flowing information than expert elites	Hyland, 1995; Marx, cited in Held, 1987; Cole, cited in Pateman, 1970; Dahl and Truman in Held, 1987; Mathews, 1994
Mode of Participation	Equal effective rights for all affected by decisions to participate (quantitative and qualitative)--including maximizing total participation throughout four "moments" of decision making (agenda setting, deliberation, choice, and implementation); mixed participation, including elections and inclusive participation in administrative institutions, especially at local level; collaborative participation of experts and general public through committees or public forums	Hyland, 1995; Held, 1987; Marx, cited in Held, 1987; Rousseau, Mills, and Cole, cited in Pateman, 1970; McPherson, Pateman, and J.S. Mill, cited in Held, 1987; Dahl, 1989; Yankelovich, 1991; Mathews, 1994

Nature of Problems and Knowledge	Problems are complex; their solutions are rooted in both technical knowledge (expertise) and public's value priorities; problems and knowledge are contested	Yankelovich, 1991; Truman, 1951; Gutmann, 1987
Size of Territory or Population	Small size better when population is homogeneous (e.g., economic resources, religious beliefs, language, etc) and high level of shared interests; large size better when population is heterogeneous, highly factional	Dahl, 1989; Madison, cited in Rossiter, 1961
Value Priorities	Government action to create freedom (balance potential tyranny of other societal powers); maximize participation by all affected by decisions in all stages of decision making; promotion of individual development (moral, social, intellectual); equality of opportunity; expansive view of due process of law; tolerance toward others; competition and cooperation are both valued	References cited previously in Table 2

Table 3

Elements of the Community Conception of Democracy[20]

Elements of Conceptions	Research Conclusions	Research Sources
Nature of Individuals and Masses	Shaped by the environment (e.g., economic self sufficiency, opportunities to participate and to be educated, non discriminatory or repressive laws); individuals and society can reach increased levels of intellectual, skill, and moral development, become more responsible, more capable and confident to participate, more considerate of the interests of all (recognizing interdependence or common good); environment is shaped by wide-ranging types of institutions ("associations") (e.g., families, churches, schools)	Rousseau and Wollstonecraft, cited in Held, 1987; Cole, cited in Pateman, 1970; VanSickle, 1979, 1983; Dewey, 1916; Barber, 1988; Kerr, 1996; Gutmann, 1987; Paley, 1995; Apple and Beane, 1995
Views on Government	Neutral or emphasized less than inclusive private associations	Dewey, 1916; Dryzek, 1996; Barber, 1988; Putnam, 1995
Information Access and Distribution	Limited only by relevancy to problem solving and individual privacy considerations	Hyland, 1995; Marx, cited in Held, 1987; Cole, cited in Pateman, 1970; Held, 1987; Thoreau, 1849/1993, 1854/1993, 1859/1993; Gutmann, 1987; Dewey, 1916; Kerr, 1996
Mode of Participation	Equal effective rights for all affected by decisions to participate (quantitative and qualitative)—including maximizing total participation throughout four "moments" of decision making (agenda setting, deliberation, choice, and implementation); collaborative participation of experts and general public through committees or public forums; problem solving collaboration across demographic and social groups	Hyland, 1995; Marx, cited in Held, 1987; Rousseau and Cole, cited in Pateman, 1970; Dewey, 1916; Barber, 1988; VanSickle, 1979, 1983; Kerr, 1996; Apple and Beane, 1995
Nature of Problems and Knowledge	Problems are complex; their solutions are rooted in technical knowledge, knowledge of local circumstance and individual experience, and local community value priorities	Yankelovich, 1991; Paley, 1995; VanSickle, 1979; Kerr, 1996

[20]The community and participatory conceptions of democracy do not differ on the nature of individuals and the masses, though some research sources have been changed based on their attachments to other differences in elements between the two conceptual components.

Size of Terrritory or Population	Small size permits opportunities for personalization and nurturance, common understanding, problem solving and collaboration, open dialogue, flexibility	Dewey, 1916; Meier, 1995; VanSickle, 1979; Kerr, 1996
Value Priorities	Non-government collective action; shared understanding, open dialogue, cooperative and collaborative problem-solving across demographic and social groups; dilution of status constraints on collaboration (emphasis on equality); development of common history, and nurturing others and community	References cited previously in Table 3